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Twenty-one years ago Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an advisory
committee to propose evidentiary rules for the federal courts,
thus beginning a movement which has worked a minor revolution in
substantive evidence law.
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I. Introduction
Twenty-one years ago Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an ad-
visory committee to propose evidentiary rules for the federal courts,
thus beginning a movement which has worked a minor revolution in
substantive evidence law., Besides reforming federal law, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been a model for evidentiary reform in many
states. Florida became one of the earliest states to adopt the federal
courts' lead and consider revising its substantive evidence law. 2 After
several unsuccessful attempts at reform, the Florida Legislature passed
the Florida Evidence Code in 1976. 3 However, the Evidence Code's ef-
fective date was delayed several times while possible conflicts between
the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature were resolved.4
1. Chief Justice Warren appointed the committee in March 1965. The Commit-
tee circulated a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates in 1969. See 46 F.R.D. 161. After a Revised Draft
was circulated in 1971, the Supreme Court prescribed the Rules effective as of July 1,
1973. See 56 F.R.D. 183. However, Congress deferred the effective date until it ex-
pressly approved the Rules. Following Congressional action, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence became effective July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595; 88 Stat. 1926 (1976).
2. Besides Florida, twenty-seven other states have adopted evidence Codes
modeled after the Federal Rules: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The Federal
Rules were also the model for the Uniform Military Rules of Evidence and for Puerto
Rico's evidence Code.
For an article discussing the Federal Rules and Florida's substantive evidence law
before passage of the Florida Evidence Code, see Note, The Federal Rules of E'vidence
and Florida Evidence Law Compared, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 384 (1975).
3. See 1976 FLA. LAws 237. For a brief description of the Florida Law Revision
Council's attempts to pass earlier versions, see Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida's Proposed
Code of Evidence, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1974) and Note, supra note 2, at 385
n.8.
4. The Evidence Code originally was to have taken effect on July 1, 1977. How-
ever, 1977 FLA. LAWS 77 delayed the effective date until July 1, 1978. Subsequently
1978 FLA. LAWS 379 delayed the effective date until July 1, 1979. After this legislative
action, the Florida Supreme Court noted that article V, section 2(a) of the Florida
Constitution gave it the sole authority to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in
all courts. . . ." Recognizing that portions of the evidence code may be procedural,
rather than substantive, the Court temporarily approved and adopted the evidence code
as originally enacted and amended by 1978 FLA. LAWS 379. See In re Florida Evidence
Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979). Following the receipt of comments from the Flor-
ida Bar and Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, the Florida Bar Board of Governors
expressed its general approval with the Evidence Code to the Florida Supreme Court.
1986] 1023
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During the delay period, several amendments to the Code were passed,
but the original 1976 text is the same for most provisions.' The Florida
Evidence Code finally became effective on July 1, 1979, applying to all
crimes committed after that date and to all other proceedings pending
or brought after October 1, 1981.6
This article discusses the major Florida evidentiary case law devel-
opments which occurred during most of 1985. 7 During this period, the
Florida courts confronted a number of evidentiary issues.8 As with
most surveys, the authors do not discuss each decision. Some opinions
are so brief that attaching any real significance to them is impossible.
Other opinions merely restate settled evidence law with which most
readers would be well familiar. Those areas discussed have been so se-
lected for three reasons: (1) because a new evidentiary development has
occurred in the area, (2) because a particular case presents an excellent
example of a fundamental principle involved in a particular area, or (3)
because the sheer number of times that a particular area presents evi-
dentiary issues makes it an important one for practitioners and for the
courts. By way of inconclusiveness, the authors note the following evi-
dentiary areas not dealt with in this article generated decisions during
However, the Bar noted that provisions of § 90.103 concerning the Code's applicability
to civil actions could create problems and suggested changes therein. The Florida Su-
preme Court agreed clarification was needed but considered this a legislative responsi-
bility. See In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979). The legislature
followed the court's suggestion and amended the Evidence Code once more to cure this
problem. See 1981 FLA. LAWS 93. The Florida Supreme Court approved and adopted
all aspects of the 1981 legislature changes. See In re Amendment of Florida Evidence
Code, 404 So. 743 (Fla. 1981).
5. Other than the provisions extending the Evidence Code's effective date, 1978
FLA. LAws 361 and 1981 FLA. LAWS 93 both amended substantive language in various
code sections.
For an article comparing the original 1976 Evidence Code before amendment with
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and pre-code Florida evidence law, see Hicks and
Matthews, Evidence, 31 U. MIAmi L. REV. 951 (1977).
For an excellent one volume work on present Florida evidence law, see C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1984).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 90.013(2) (1985).
7. This article discusses cases in 462 So. 2d through 476 So. 2d.
8. There were 154 reported cases during the survey period which dealt with evi-
dentiary issues. Most, but not all, of these issues involved various sections of the Flor-
ida Evidence Code.
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the survey period: offers to compromises;' guilty pleas;' 0 character evi-
dence;"1 competency of witness;12 dead man's statute;' 3 rape shield
law;"'4 academic privilege;' 5 informer's privilege;' 6 medical review com-
9. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (1985); H.R.J. Bar-B-Q, Inc. v. Shapiro, 463 So. 2d
403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (offer made to plaintiff upon being fired was not
a compromise since there was no "claim ... disputed as to validity or amount at the
time the offer was made"); Benoit, Inc. v. District Bd. of Trustees, 463 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (§ 90.408 excludes all statements made in compromise
negotiations as well as the actual compromise offers themselves).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (1985); Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant's statements to a police officer made two months
after guilty plea, in effort to render substantial assistance in return for a reduced sen-
tence were not made in connection with plea negotiations or the plea itself when there
was "no showing that the guilty plea was part of any bargain with the state to accept
defendant's cooperation and thereupon recommend a reduction. .... ).
I!. See FLA. STAT.§ 90.404(l)(a); Von Carter v. State, 468 So. 2d 276, 278
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), remanded on other grounds, 478 So. 2d 10 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 482 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (prosecutor's
reference to scar on defendant's neck during defendant's cross-examination for a bur-
glary- robbery allegedly committed with a knife was an "insinuation of bad character"
violating principle that a defendant must place his character in issue before the state
can attack it); Wolack v. State, 464 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review
denied, 476 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1985) (insufficient foundation for admission of reputation
evidence when knowledge of reputation was based solely on witness' official position as
a police officer).
12. See FLA. STAT. § 90.601, 90.604 (1985); State v. Barber, 465 So. 2d 264
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court should not have excluded witness' testimony
even though it believed he had perjured himself in two depositions concerning the crim-
inal charges, since the jury is the sole judge of witness' credibility); Howard Bros. v.
Sotuyo, 472 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (witness had adequate founda-
tion based on personal knowledge despite his lack of authority to fire employees to
testify about what police jobs an injured police officer-plaintiff could hold).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 90.102 (1985); Comodeca v. Comodeca, 464 So. 2d 662,
663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (wife of a claimant against an estate is an "inter-
ested party" under the dead man's statute since she was "closely allied with her hus-
band . . . [and] would directly gain or lose from the resolution of the case").
For a general discussion of Florida's Dead Man Statute see Note, The Dead
Man's Statute Before and After The Florida Evidence Code - A Step in the Right
Direction, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 480 (1976).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1985); Gonzalez v. State, 471 So. 2d 214 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error in sexual battery case when defense was fabrication to
exclude victim's forged note which showed her prior fantasizing of sexual activity);
Kemp v. State, 464 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense properly ex-
cluded from asking about victim's virginity since this was irrelevant where its purpose
was to impeach her testimony that she was unfamilar about sexual relations and to
impeach her by showing she lied to the examining physician when asked if she had ever
1986] 1025
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mittee privilege; 17 and the attorney-client privilege. 18 Likewise this arti-
had sex before the attack); Marr v. State, 463 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), partially rev'd on other grounds, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(en banc) review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1985) (no denial of defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation in precluding evidence of sexual relations between
victim and her boyfriend since defendant was able to show their close relationship by
other means and thus argue the victim was biased against him for having told authori-
ties of her boyfriend's alleged criminal activity).
However, both Marr and Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) suggest that a complete exclusion of any evidence in reliance on § 794.022
showing the victim'sbias towards the defendant may violate the Confrontation Clause.
For a general discussion of potential constitutional problems with rape shield laws see
Tanford and Bocchino, Rape Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 544 (1980).
15. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 1188, 1195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (court declared "there is no academic priviledge in Florida", citing Mar-
shall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) in partially overruling com-
pany's objection to request for production of documents).
16. See Aldazabal v. State, 471 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (con-
viction reversed when state failed to determine and provide defense with the address of
an informer who was a vital witness); State v. Carnegie, 472 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (mere defense assertion that informer is vital witness and
should be produced is not sufficient when no defense was specified and the informer
was not "the sole material witness to the events").
17. See former FLA. STAT. § 768.04(4) (1983), now FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5)
(1985); Mercy Hosp. v. Department of Professional Regulation, 467 So. 2d 1058 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (hospital per review committee records are not privileged from
subpoena by the Department conducting disciplinary investigation of two doctors);
HCA of Florida, Inc. v. Cooper, 475 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (even
though they are not explicitly protected by statutory language, a party must still show
exceptional need to justify production of medical review committee records).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985). Two opinions discussed when the state can
call defense counsel as witnesses in criminal cases. In Perez v. State, 474 So. 2d 398
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) review denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1986), the court
found error in the state's listing of defense counsel as a witness, since the testimony
desired was available from other sources. The listing compelled the attorney to with-
draw and forced the defendant to accept a continuance beyond the speedy trial rule's
limits. The court reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered his discharge.
In State v. Schmidt, 474 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), defense coun-
sel successfully appealed from an order finding him in contempt for refusing to be a
witness. The attorney's client had been granted immunity in partial return for his testi-
mony in a first-degree murder trial. When the client was deposed, his counsel was not
present. At the deposition, the client testified about communications with counsel in
which the client had made a confession. Afterwards, the attorney was subpoenaed to
testify about the confession but claimed the lawyer-client privilege. The Fifth District
Court of Appeal found that the client had wanted counsel at the deposition but had
1026 [Vol. 10
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cle does not discuss any statutory amendments passed in 1985.19
been persuaded to go ahead by assurances from the attorneys present that they would
protect his interests. This was obviously not done, since neither deposing counsel nor
the state's attorney had warned the client he could not limit his answers to the mere
fact that he had previously shown defense counsel a confession. Given these circum-
stances, the court refused to find a valid waiver occurred at the deposition and reversed
the contempt order.
On the civil side, the Florida Supreme Court decided two major cases involving
the attorney-client privilege. In City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing, 468
So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985), the court addressed the relation between the Florida Public
Records Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01 et seq. (1985) and section 90.502. The court found
that the lawyer-client privilege "does not exempt written communications between law-
yers and governmental clients from disclosure as public records." Id. at 220. However,
the court found FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (1985) created a limited attorney work
product disclosure exception for any document which may qualify as a public record
"until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial proceedings" for which the docu-
ment had been prepared. Similarly, in Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So.
2d 821 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court rejected arguments that section 90.502
required an exception to Florida's Sunshine Law, FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1985), for a
meeting between a city council and its attorney to discuss pending litigation.
These last two decisions were not chosen for review since they have already been
thoroughly discussed in two articles. See Comment, Florida's Open Government Laws:
No Exceptions for Attorney-Client Communications, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 388
(1985); Smith, The Public Records Law and The Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client
Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Product Exception, 14 STETSON L. REV.
493 (1985).
19. The Florida legislature passed several bills which will affect evidentiary is-
sues in future cases. One made minor textual changes to clarify FLA. STAT. § 90.606,
relating to interpreters and translators and FLA. STAT. § 90.605(2) relating to what a
child must understand before being found competent to testify. See 1985 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 85-53, §§ 2, 3 (West).
Almost all the major legislative changes concerned evidence in child abuse cases.
The first recognized the privilege for confidential communications to clergy when deal-
ing with abuse cases concerning the elderly, disabled or children. See 1985 Fla. Sess.
Law. Serv. 85-28, §§ 1, 2 (West). The second provided for the use of video taped
testimony or testimony by closed circuit television in child abuse and child sex abuse
cases. See 1985 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 85-53, §§ 5, 6 (West). The third created a new
hearsay exception, FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985), for out-of-court statements of chil-
dren eleven or younger reporting sexual abuse, provided the trial court does not find the
statements are untrustworthy. See 1985 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 85-53 § 4 (West).
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985) clearly attempts to avoid Confrontation Clause
problems. When the state actually calls the child as a witness, as well as admitting his
out-of-court statements under this provision, no constitutional question exists. However,
when a child is not a witness, for the out-of-court statements to be admissible under the
new exception, the child must be unavailable under FLA. STAT. § 90.804(1) and the
trial court must find that having the child testify would cause emotional or mental
1986] 1027
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Before discussing cases dealing with specific evidence issues, a
brief statistical overview is in order. Probably to no one's surprise, the
majority of cases presenting evidentiary issues were criminal.20 How-
ever, a surprising number of both criminal and civil cases were reversed
for evidentiary error. 2' Whether this survey period included an unusu-
ally high number of reversals is impossible to say since no statistics are
available for prior years. Any explanation for the number of reversals
would be somewhat speculative. Florida trial courts may perhaps be too
lax in their evidence- rulings. Alternatively, the appellate courts may
harm. Furthermore, there must be some corroborating evidence that the abuse actually
occurred. The dual requirement of unavailability under § 90.804(1) and that testifying
would cause the child harm is somewhat puzzling. If the trial court finds a child un-
available under § 90.804(1) any confrontation problems should be solved. Similar state
hearsay exceptions require only unavailability and corroboration, see MINN. STAT. §
595.02(3) (1984).
While § 90.803(23) makes radical changes in Florida evidence law, child abuse
hearsay exceptions have been passed in at least eleven other states. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH.
37, para. 704-6(4)(c); (Smith-Hurd 1984) IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1984); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.96(6) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1982); MINN. STAT. §
595.02(3) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-411 (1983); VT. R. EVID. 803(24) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982).
As can be expected, these new exceptions have received much recent attention
from commentators. For discussion of various state provisions dealing with new hearsay
exceptions in child abuse cases see Pierron, The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissi-
bility of Child-Victim Hearsay Statements, 52 J.B.A.K. 88 (1983); Skoler, New Hear-
say Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
I (1984). Some authors claim that the new hearsay exceptions are unconstitutional. See
e.g. Note, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the
Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L.REv. 387 (1984) arguing that
Washington's law, which is similar to Florida's except that it only requires unavailabil-
ity and corroboration, is unconstitutional. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc), found the new hearsay exception did not violate a defendant's confrontation
rights.
For a recent article discussing the constitutional problems presented by both the
new child abuse hearsay exceptions and the use of closed circuit television or videotape
statements, see Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face-to-Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985).
20. Of the 154 total cases, 98 or 64% were criminal, while 56 or 36% were civil.
21. Florida appellate courts found evidentiary error in 64 out of 154 cases or
42%. Criminal cases produced a lower percentage of reversals, 40 out of 98 or 41%,
than civil cases, 27 out of 56 or 43%. Since the forty reversals in the criminal cases
include five where the state secured reversals of trial court evidence errors on interlocu-
tory appeals, the percentage of cases where criminal defendants prevailed is even
smaller.
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possibly be stricter than those in other states. Most likely the reason
partially lies in the frequent use Florida appellate courts make of per
curiam affirmances. Appellate courts may often be writing opinions
only where necessary to instruct lower courts or where a new issue of
law demanding extensive consideration is presented.
In line with the statistical overview, it is important to recognize
that the number of reversals could have been even higher. Florida ap-
pellate courts, like those of most states, will not review and reverse trial
courts' rulings in certain situations worth noting. First, the appellate
courts realize they review cases on a cold record, removed from the
sometimes hectic fray of trial courts. Thus they regularly defer to trial
court evidence rulings, except when clear error had been committed.22
Second, trial counsel inaction often lead to procedural defaults when
objections to admission of evidence were not made timely. 3 In most
22. See Merchant v. State, 476 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
"A trial court has wide discretion in. . . admission of evidence, and, unless an abuse
of discretion can be shown, its rulings should not be disturbed on appeal." Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1985) provides in part that:
(1) A court may predicate error . . . on the basis of admitted or excluded
evidence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and:
(2) when the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection. . . ap-
pears on the record, stating the specific ground of objection ....
Florida appellate courts almost always refuse to consider evidentiary arguments
when trial counsel has not made a proper contemporaneous objection. This includes the
failure to object at all and the failure to object until after the questioned evidence has
been admitted. See S.C. v. State, 471 So. 2d 1326, 1328-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) where the court refused to hear argument on one evidence issue since no objec-
tion to admission was ever made and likewise refused to hear arguments concerning a
witness' competency to testify since no objection was made about this until the close of
the state's case.
In Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court ex-
plained the contemporaneous objection rule's rationale while refusing to consider a de-
fense argument that neutron activation test results should not have been admitted to
help show the defendant had probably fired a gun used to kill two victims.
If appellant had objected . . . on the ground he now relies upon, the
trial court could have made a determination of whether there was an ade-
quate reason for excluding the evidence. The court could have inquired
into the questions of whether the precise quality or substance of the solu-
tion used should be a matter of predicate to the admissibility of the test by
reason of its effect on the test's reliability. . . . An appellate court is in a
weak position to rule on the legal issue of admissibility of scientific evi-
dence when because of the lack of an objection or motion below, there is
no unfolding of the factual basis upon which the legal question turns.
Id. at 396.
1986] 1029
9
Dobson and Braccialarghe: Survey: Evidence
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
instances, even previously made motions in limine would not suffice to
preserve the record for appeal, if there were no timely objection at
trial.2 4 Third, trial counsel also sometimes failed to preserve evidentiary
issues for review by not making adequate offers of proof. 25 However, if
the trial court has previously granted an opponent's motion in limine
excluding a party's desired proof, there is no necessity to attempt to
introduce it at trial to preserve the issue for appeal.26 Finally, applica-
tion of the harmless error rule prevented reversals in some cases even
when evidentiary error did occur.27
During this survey period, Florida courts also applied the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule to workmen's compensation proceedings, see Rinker Materials Corp. v. Hill,
471 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); but refused to find that counsel's failure
to object to an improper calculation of points in a sentencing proceeding barred review
of the sentence. See Smith v. State, 475 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
For other cases citing the lack of a contemporaneous objection as a ground to
reject evidence arguments, see Barclay v. State, 470 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1985); Dougan v.
State, 470 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied sub nor. Dougan v. Florida, 106 S. Ct.
1499 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985) (even though a motion
in limine to exclude prior crimes evidence had already been denied, failure to renew
objection to admission at trial waived the issue for appeal).
However, one recent case seems to have created a limited exception. In Fincke v.
Peoples, 476 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), just before jury selection the
trial court overruled a motion in limine to exclude certain deposition testimony. After
opening statements, one deposition was read and counsel objected to it. As expected,
the trial court overruled the objection. Since two other depositions had also been cov-
ered by the motion in limine, counsel asked that a continuing objection be recognized
to admission of these also. Since the trial court agreed to this procedure and had only a
short time before overruling what would have been the same objection by denying the
motion in limine, the record was adequately preserved for review.
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(b) (1985), allows reversal for evidentiary error only
if substantial rights are affected and if "[w]hen the ruling is one excluding evidence,
• . . the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof. ... "
Both lack of any offer of proof at all, see Connell v. Guardianship of Connell, 476
So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) and inadequate responses to an opponent's
objections come within this requirement. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
1985) (since counsel only argued the relevancy of excluded evidence to the trial court,
an argument that the statements were against a declarant's penal interest could not be
raised on appeal).
26. See Bender v. State, 472 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1) (1985) embodies the harmless error rule by its re-
quirement that error can only be found if "a substantial right of the party is adversely
affected." In cases of federal constitutional error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967) requires that an appellate court "be able to declare a belief that [the error]
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
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II. Judicial Notice
The Florida Evidence Code covers judicial notice both of facts and
of law.28 Usually cases involving the propriety of taking judicial notice
are very straightforward and uncomplicated. That situation prevailed
during this survey period.29
In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J.,30 is worth noting since it
presents a good example of the proper limits of judicial notice and its
inadequacy to cure major defects in procedure and proof. The Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitation Services (HRS) filed dependency
petitions on two minor children claiming they had been physically,
mentally and sexually abused. At the initial hearing, both parents ap-
peared and waived their right to appointed counsel. The mother admit-
ted the children should be in HRS custody; but the father neither de-
nied nor admitted the petitions' allegations, nor did he give up the
children's custody. Despite this, the Duval County Circuit Court en-
tered a written order finding both parents stipulated to dependency.
Over one year later, HRS petitioned for permanent commitment of the
children to it for adoption, alleging that the mother consented to this
and that the father had sexually abused the children. The commitment
petitions were filed as new cases rather than as part of the dependency
proceedings.
At the commitment hearing, HRS asked the court to judicially
notice the two dependency cases. The father's counsel objected because
the files were not adequate evidence of abuse for commitment purposes
Besides the 64 cases reversed because of evidentiary error, there were 12 opinions
where the appellate courts found evidentiary error but held it was harmless.
28. See FLA. STAT., § 90.201-202 (1985).
29. See Hill v. State, 471 So. 2d 567 (1985), aft'd, 486 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (motion to strike appendix to brief on grounds it contained docu-
ments not in record granted; documents possibly could have been judicially noticed by
trial court but not proper for appellate court to do so); Rook v. Rook, 469 So. 2d 172
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (local guidelines which set child support for dependents
do not meet test for judicial notice and could not be considered part of the appellate
record).
Neither Hill nor Rook explain why the appellate court could not have taken judi-
cial notice of the matters involved. To that extent, they have little informational value.
At least one Florida decision has found that the appellate courts are not required to
take judicial notice of matters covered by § 90.202. See Hillsborough County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Public Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 424 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
30. 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 475 So. 2d
693 (Fla. 1985).
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and because the abuse allegations had to be proved independently at
the commitment hearing. The circuit court overruled the objections and
noticed the files. Once this occurred, HRS argued all questions of
abuse had already been proven in the dependency proceedings, so that
only the issue of disposition was left. The father's counsel unsuccess-
fully argued that the father had been unrepresented at the dependency
adjudication so that the abuse must be proved before any disposition
consideration was proper. The circuit court found, in reliance on the
two judicially noticed files, that the abuse element needed for termina-
tion of parental rights had been proved by the parents' supposed
stipulations.
The district court of appeal first examined whether judicial notice
of the prior files was proper when the father had been unrepresented in
the dependency proceedings. While it recognized that a court can judi-
cially notice its own files, 31 such a procedure would have been unneces-
sary here if HRS had filed the commitment petitions as supplements to
the original dependency proceedings rather than as separate actions.
The filing procedure used required the circuit court to judicially notice
the other cases to show continuing jurisdiction over the children.
However, even a showing of continuing circuit court jurisdiction
was not enough to uphold the commitment action. This only demon-
strated the circuit court had authority to proceed; it did not demon-
strate that the father had abused the children. Apparently in judicially
noticing the prior files, the circuit court never specified what records or
exhibits from those cases it was making a part of the commitment pro-
ceedings. This being so, not all the records from the dependency cases,
especially the crucial one which would allegedly show the parents' stip-
ulation to the dependency petition, were before the appellate court.
Even after the record was ordered supplemented, the alleged stipulation
could not be found. The district court of appeal, therefore, could not
find the father had agreed in the dependency proceedings that he
abused the children. Since no independent proof of abuse was offered in
the commitment action, the circuit court's commitment order was re-
versed and the case remanded for a new evidentiary hearing in the
commitment issue.
While the same result may occur after the second commitment
hearing, the court of appeal's decision was certainly correct. Noticing
the mere existence of another judicial proceeding is different from judi-
31. See FLA. STAT. § 90.202(6) (1985).
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cially noticing documents allegedly introduced therein as proof. Had
the father signed a stipulation waiving counsel and stipulating to the
alleged abuse, it should be easy to produce. Even if no such statement
were signed, as long as the father had stated, somewhere on the record,
his agreement with the dependency petitions' allegations, that could ar-
guably have been introduced as an admission. Of course, if both the
dependency and commitment petitions had been filed under the same
number, there would have been no need to judicially notice the earlier
files in any respect. Failure to follow this simple procedure created a
major gap in proof which judicial notice could not cure.
III. Relevancy
A. In General
The Florida Evidence Code follows the Federal Rules in its ap-
proach to relevancy. The Code expresses the general desire that all rel-
evant evidence should be permitted "except as provided by law."3 2 Evi-
dence will be relevant if it has a tendency "to prove or disprove a
material fact."33 That the Evidence Code does not go beyond this brief
definition is not surprising. No category of information can be consid-
ered inherently relevant to all cases. What will be material or immate-
rial34 is not a function of substantive evidence law but rather of the
underlying claims and defenses in a particular trial. 35 Likewise,
whether certain information tends to prove a material fact depends
upon the strength or weakness of the logical connection between the
information and the matter it is being offered for. Since relevancy is a
function of logical deduction and substantive law, merely changing a
few facts can produce major results. As a result, cases discussing the
general relevancy of certain evidence are seldom of much precedential
32. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1985).
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1985).
34. F.R. Evid. 401, defining Relevant Evidence, does not use the words "material
fact" because of the ambiguity which the drafters felt was inherent in this term. See
F.R. Evid. 401 Advisory Comment. However, the same concept is expressed by F.R.
Evid. 401's language that the fact involved must be "of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action".
35. Evidence can even be admissible as to one issue but not as to another issue.
FLA. STAT. § 90.107 expressly recognizes the concept of limited admissibility. During
this survey period, Parsons v. Motor Homes of Am., Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) presented the unusual situation of a reversal because the trial
court expressly refused to admit evidence for only limited purposes.
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value. Only one general relevancy case decided during the survey pe-
riod is likely to be of much importance."6
In Pitts v. State,37 an ex-deputy sheriff was charged with vehicular
homicide arising from the operation of his patrol car while responding
to a fellow officer's call for back-up assistance. After receiving the call,
Pitts notified his central communications office that he was responding
but failed to mention he was operating "code one." This was office ter-
minology for proceeding with both lights flashing and the siren on. On
his way to the call, Pitts attempted to make a car proceeding in the
same direction yield. Since this was near the call's vicinity, Pitts had
turned the siren off as police academy training had directed. When the
car did not yield, Pitts tried to pass after checking for incoming traffic
but met a second car coming in the opposite direction. Although evi-
dence showed Pitts drove into a guardrail to avoid hitting this car, a
collision still occurred and the car's driver was killed. At trial, the de-
fense and state disputed how fast Pitts was driving when he tried to
pass. State experts estimated his speed at close to eighty miles per
hour, while the defense claimed it was between fifty-five and sixty. Evi-
dence also showed that the passing may have been attempted in a no-
passing zone with a fifty miles per hour speed limit.
Besides this evidence, the state called a captain in Pitts' office and
through him introduced the office manual requiring an officer deciding
to respond "code one" to inform the communications center of such.
The state cross-examined Pitts about whether he violated department
regulations by proceeding "code one" without telling anyone and ar-
gued on closing that his violation of the manual helped show Pitts
drove recklessly.38 Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that
36. For other cases discussing the general relevancy of evidence decided during
the survey period see Smith v. Telophase Nat. Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 471 So. 2d 163
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence of defendant's past practices in cremating de-
ceased persons admissible on issue of whether conduct in the case was outrageous);
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
(evidence that driver had not been cited for traffic violation following an accident
should have been inadmissible and inquiry about such should have been mistrial); Don-
ahue v. Albertson's, Inc., 473 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), (evidence that
two months after plaintiff had been injured by a door's improper closing the doorswitch
snapped because the door had been slammed into, was not so remote as to be irrelevant
when a defense expert claimed any impact on the switch, from door being mistakenly
slammed into, would be negligible).
37. 473 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 10
(Fla. 1986).
38. FLA. STAT. § 782.071 (1981) under which the defendant was charged with
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while a violation of the manual alone was not sufficient proof of reck-
lessness, "[Y]ou may consider this circumstance together with the
other circumstances in the evidence considering whether the vehicle of
the defendant was operating in a reckless manner."39
The district court of appeal reversed the conviction finding the
manual's admission was error for several reasons. The court found that
no evidence was ever introduced to help explain to the jury the man-
ual's purpose or the purpose of the "code one" reporting regulation.
Indeed the manual itself contained a preface stating it was "for inter-
nal use only, and does not enlarge an officer's civil or criminal liability
in any way."'40 Without any guidance, the jury could only speculate as
to what connection Pitts' reporting violation had with the charges.
Perhaps even more important to the court's decision was its finding
that introducing the manual could have contributed to an erroneous
decision by introducing a false standard. Florida case law recognizes
that evidence describing what is the standard practice or custom for
certain occupations is often introduced to help show whether someone
has breached the appropriate level of conduct for his profession, thus
possibly being negligent. However, in a criminal case the same evidence
is irrelevant when the question is not whether the party has been negli-
gent but has violated a higher standard of care. Here Pitts should have
been found not guilty if he was merely negligent. Pitts was charged
with a crime for violating a statutory standard of care, recklessness in
operating a motor vehicle, not for violating a department rule. Since
the state did not show a connection between the two, admission of Pitts'
non-reporting violation was reversible error.4
B. Similar Happenings and Circumstances in Civil Cases
No specific rule in either the Florida Code or Federal Rules of
vehicular homicide provided in part: "Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human
being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to
cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another . .
39. 473 So. 2d at 1373.
40. Id.
41. The court rejected state arguments that since Pitts forgot- to follow the re-
porting procedure this demonstrated reckelessness.
Even if Pitts had been sued civilly for wrongful death, evidence of his non-report-
ing should not be admissible unless some showing is made that this was negligence
causing the other driver's death. This author believes such a causal connection is not
possible.
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Evidence governs the admissibility of other occurrences similar to the
event involved in the present civil litigation. The admissibility of similar
happenings evidence is treated as a subspecies of relevancy. However,
this type of evidence is offered so frequently in civil cases that courts
are often faced with questions in this area. Two basic questions arise in
dealing with similar happenings evidence in civil cases: (1) is what the
proponent claims the evidence shows relevant,42 and (2) has a sufficient
degree of similarity between the extraneous event and the one involved
in the litigation been established. 43 Unless both questions can be an-
swered affirmatively, trial judges are justified in excluding this type of
information.
Trial courts must be careful to allow proponents a fair chance to
establish the predicate similarity necessary or else reversal is merited.
Saunders v. Florida Keys Electric Co-op Association44 presents an ex-
ample of how hasty discovery rulings may later cause reversals because
they affect evidentiary trial rulings in this area. The plaintiff was in-
jured when the mast of his trailered sailboat hit an overhead power line
in a marina parking lot. During depositions, plaintiff learned that the
defense knew of other incidents where sailboat masts had hit overhead
power lines in nearby marinas. However, the trial court ruled any dis-
covery about the details of these incidents was irrelevant. At trial,
Saunders tried to prove the defendant knew the lines in his marina
42. Evidence of similar happenings appears to be most frequently used to prove
notice. However, the possible relevancy of similar happenings is limitless and purely
depends on the underlying substantive law.
An interesting use of similar happenings evidence recently occurred in Trees by
and Through Trees v. K-Mart, 467 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) review denied,
479 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985). The plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution/false arrest suit
claiming damages stemming from her shoplifting arrest and charge which the store
later dropped. To show no damages, the defense introduced evidence that the plaintiff
had previously been arrested for shoplifting and taken to a police station, like in the
instant case. Those charges were resolved by juvenile services counseling, and the plain-
tiff suffered no psychological injury from them. The trial court's ruling that the two
events were sufficiently similar for the defense to claim that Trees had likewise suffered
no emotional trauma from the K-Mart arrest was affirmed on appeal.
Similar happenings evidence in criminal cases is governed by Florida's Williams
Rule, FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). For discussion of this area see infra text accompanying
notes 69-107.
43. For a recent case finding reversible error in the improper admission of evi-
dence because the two events dealt with dissimilar matters, see 3-M Corp. v. Brown,
475 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
44. 471 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 482 So. 2d 348
(Fla. 1986).
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presented a danger to people towing sailboats by introducing evidence
that the defendant knew about the nearby marina incidents. However,
the court sustained an objection that no showing was made that these
other accidents were similar to Saunders'. After a defense verdict,
plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeal found reversal merited for two reasons. The
early ban on discovery had been incorrect as evidence about how the
other accidents occurred was clearly relevant. "Evidence of similar in-
cidents at locations other than the place where the incident in question
occurred is relevant . . . for the purpose of showing the existence of a
danger or defect and notice or knowledge of." 45 When the trial court
subsequently rejected evidence of the other incidents, the error in its
discovery ruling became even more critical. In essence, the two rulings
unfairly put the plaintiff in an impossible position since he had been
unable to obtain the needed predicate trial evidence due to the earlier
incorrect discovery ruling.
Saunders demonstrates the use of similar happenings evidence to
show actual knowledge of a dangerous condition. However, actual
knowledge may not always be necessary in order for an injured party to
recover. In some instances, similar circumstances evidence will be rele-
vant to show constructive instead of actual notice. In Fazio v. Dania
Jai-Alai Palace, Inc.,4" plaintiff sued when she slipped on liquid in an
aisle at the defendant's premises. To prove defendant's constructive no-
tice of the aisle's condition, Fazio tried to call witnesses who would
have testified that the aisles were commonly littered with spilled drinks
and food. However, the trial court limited plaintiff's proof to evidence
of the aisle's condition the evening she slipped and fell. After a defense
verdict, the court of appeal reversed.
Fazio presents an interesting contrast to Saunders. Both plaintiffs
attempt to use events happening at other times to prove the notice ele-
ment of their negligence claims. In Saunders, the question involved
proving sufficient similarity between the two events. However, in Fazio,
there was no serious question about the similarity. All the occurrences
involved the same part of the same premises and were allegedly caused
by the same factor. Thus, Fazio had to be resolved on the issue
whether the other incidents at other times could ever be relevant to
show constructive notice. As the court of appeal noted, this question
was controlled by the underlying substantive law. In Florida, amuse-
45. Id. at 89.
46. 473 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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ment places, where large numbers of patrons congregate, are held to a
higher standard of care than other public places and must be kept in
"reasonably safe condition commensurate with the business con-
ducted. ' 47 Previous cases had allowed circumstantial proof to be of-
fered on the issue of notice and had not limited this to conditions on the
day of an accident, but extended it to similar conditions on the same
premises at other times.48 Thus, the plaintiffs excluded similar circum-
stance evidence should have been admitted to show "necessary or ongo-
ing problems, which could have resulted from operational negligence or
negligent maintenance."4 9
C. Habit Evidence
The concept of habit has been aptly described as "one's regular
response to a repeated situation. '50 Assuming someone has adopted a
regularized method of dealing with a particular situation, it is logical to
assume that the person followed this method on an occasion in question
unless there is strong proof showing otherwise. Habit evidence is admis-
sible in most jurisdictions, assuming sufficient evidence has been intro-
duced to prove such a habit actually existed.
Comparison of the Federal Rules of Evidence language with that
of the Florida Evidence Code would logically lead a reader to believe
that habit evidence is not admissible in Florida. Like Federal Rule of
Evidence 406,51 section 90.406 of the Florida Statutes52 specifically
provides for the admission of evidence concerning the routine practice
of an organization. However, unlike the Federal Rules, there is no men-
tion of habit evidence in section 90.406. Since the Evidence Code's
drafters expressly approved admission of routine organizational prac-
tices but did not do so with habit evidence, the statutory construction
47. Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1948).
48. See, e.g., Firth v. Marhoefer, 406 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
49. 473 So. 2d at 1348.
50. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 195 at p. 575 (3d ed. 1984).
51. F.R. Evid. 406 states in part that: "Evidence of the habit of a person or of
the routine practice of an organization ... is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice."
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.406 states in part: "Evidence of the routine practice of an
organization ... is admissible to prove that the conduct of the organization on a par-
ticular occasion was in conformity with the routine practice."
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principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" would seem to have
eliminated habit as an admissible mode of proof in Florida.53 However,
despite the logic of such statutory construction, Florida courts have
consistently admitted habit evidence. 54 Decisions during this survey pe-
riod show the continuation of this policy. 55
Fincke v. Peeples56 is an important habit evidence case since it
discusses the foundational predicate. This was a medical malpractice
suit arising from the death of a seventeen year old boy following knee
53. At least one article commenting on the new Florida Evidence Code believed
the statutory ommission of any reference to habit evidence meant that such proof was
not admissible. See Hicks and Matthews, supra note 5, at 967.
54. The Law Revision Council note following § 90.406 specifically states that
"[t]his section is not applicable to the habit of an individual." Professor Ehrhardt
claims that any mention of habit was deleted because of the drafters' "feeling that it
should be left to the court to determine as a matter of circumstantial evidence whether
there was sufficient probative value to allow the admission of the habit evidence." C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1984). From this he concludes that "[t]his
exclusion should not be interpreted as intention to prohibit the introduction of all habit
evidence." Id.
Examined closely, this is not a sufficent justification to conclude that habit evi-
dence should still be admissible. In every case, whether § 90.406 expressly mentioned
habit or not, the courts would have to decide "whether there was sufficient probative
value to allow the admission of the habit evidence." This language merely means that
courts will have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a sufficient predicate to
prove habit has been shown. However, this should not be something surprising. Federal
Rule 406 allows habit evidence but leaves it up to the courts to decide whether the
evidence is logically relevant in individual cases and whether a sufficient predicate has
been established in an individual case.
Professor Ehrhardt offers a second and stronger justification why habit evidence is
still recognized in Florida despite § 90.406's language. Section 90.102 provides that the
Evidence Code "shall replace and supersede existing statutory or common law in con-
flict with its provisions." Since § 90.406 arguably does not directly conflict with pre-
code Florida cases allowing habit evidence, then its failure to expressly mention habit
should not matter. The weakness with this argument comes from the fact that pre-code
Florida law also admitted evidence of routine organization practice. Under Professor
Ehrhardt's second argument, § 90.406 becomes completely superfluous as it merely
codifies, either directly or indirectly, pre-code Florida evidence law. One questions why
the drafters bothered to take what would be such a purely meaningless act.
55. Only one case during the survey period discussed evidence of a routine prac-
tice of an organization, see Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Ocha, 472 So. 2d
1338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review dismissed, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1985) (drivers' license examiner's testimony that she always required minor applicants
to secure signed parental consent form was sufficient to help prove the defendant had
signed such, even though a copy could not be found).
56. 476 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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surgery. After surgery, Thomas Peeples was taken by the surgeon and
the anesthesiologist to the hospital's recovery room. The factual issues
revolve around whether he was given proper care following his arrival.
Both the anesthesiologist and a recovery room nurse testified about the
proper procedures regarding the removal of an endotracheal tube which
had been used to help Peeples' breathing during the operation. The an-
esthesiologist testified that unless a patient was fighting the tube it
should not be removed. The danger in doing so is that the patient
might still be unconscious, unable to breathe on his own. Even when
the tube is removed, there is the danger a patient might react to the
anesthesia and stop breathing. To prevent this, a recovery room nurse is
supposed to monitor the patient's condition. At trial, the recovery room
nurse testified that the anesthesiologist removed the tube as soon as
Peeples entered the recovery room. Her testimony was partially corrob-
orated by the surgeon who momentarily left the recovery room after
arrival and returned to find Peeples had been extubated. Shortly there-
after, Peeples' heart stopped beating. Even when the tube was rein-
serted, Peeples never regained consciousness and died almost two weeks
later.
The plaintiffs attempted to introduce deposition testimony of the
recovery room nurse regarding other times when she felt the anesthesi-
ologist had extubated patients in the recovery room prematurely. The
nurse's deposition testimony also mentioned how she and other nurses
had talked about the anesthesiologist and how they felt patients were
being extubated too soon. Plaintiffs offered this evidence to show that
the anesthesiologist had a habit of prematurely extubating patients and
that the hospital was on notice of this. While upholding the verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals rejected their position that
the nurse's deposition testimony, giving her opinion about the doctor's
habit, supplied a sufficient foundation to show that such a habit existed.
Fincke apparently limits proof of habit to testimony regarding a num-
ber of specific instances of conduct which the court finds have been
repeated sufficiently to arise to the level of a constant practice. Opin-
ions, whether or not a person has a particular habit without detailed
testimony based on concrete factual observances as to why the witness
has such a belief, will no longer be a sufficient foundation. Clearly, in
this case, the nurses involved in the recovery room could have seen the
doctor repeatedly extubate patients too early on many occasions, thus
rising to the level of habit evidence. However, without their testimony
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relating this, their opinions alone that this occurred were insufficient.57
Fincke and other cases during this survey period 8 show whether
Florida courts are interpreting section 90.406 correctly or not. The
courts have and will most likely continue to allow the introduction of
habit evidence. This being so, the Florida legislature should either
amend section 90.406 to expressly include habit evidence as an admissi-
ble mode of proof or amend section 90.406 to make it clear that only
routine practice of an organization, and not habit evidence, should be
admissible.
D. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Florida Statute section 90.407 follows the common law and Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence by prohibiting evidence of remedial conduct af-
ter an event to show an opponent's negligence or culpable conduct.
Generally, before applying this prohibition courts must find the action
taken was both (1) subsequent and remedial and (2) is being offered
for a forbidden purpose. Two widely debated issues involve the admissi-
bility of subsequent remedial measures when they are offered in a strict
liability case and when they were made by a third person, rather than a
party involved in the litigation. Two recent district court of appeal
cases take a pro-defendant approach to both these issues.59
1. Third-Party Action
Subsequent remedial measures are excluded for several reasons.
One is the public policy rationale that parties should be encouraged to
promptly take warranted safety measures without having to fear creat-
ing damaging evidence against themselves. Another reason claims that
57. This comes close to rejecting Professor Ehrhardt's position that "[h]abit may
be proved by opinion testimony from a witness with adequate knowledge." C.
EHRHARDT, supra note 5, § 406.1, at 158.
58. The only other case dealing with habit evidence during the survey period was
Hall v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 479 So. 2d
118 (Fla. 1985) where the court recognized a party's right to introduce habit evidence
relating to past instances of a defendant's intoxication and driving.
59. Two other cases during the survey period briefly dealt with subsequent reme-
dial measures. However, the references to § 90.407 in both are so brief that the discus-
sions have little value. See Donahue v. Albertson's Inc., 472 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 3-M Corp. v. Brown, 475 So. 2d 994, 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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when a party seeks safety measures after an accident, this should not
necessarily be construed as an admission of fault. The party could have
been completely without culpability in not acting sooner and is only
acting as a good citizen should, in now trying to prevent future harms.
From this second rationale, arguments have been made that when third
persons make subsequent remedial measures, rather than parties to the
action, the prohibitory ban against evidence of these is inapplicable."0
Despite this argument at least one district court of appeal appears to
have taken a per se ban against all evidence of subsequent measures
used to prove uncontraverted issues, no matter who made the repairs.
In Thursby v. Reynolds Metal Co.,61 a worker sued after his fin-
gers were injured in an aluminum can press the defendant designed.
Thursby alleged claims both in strict liability and negligence, arguing
that Reynolds had defectively designed and manufactured the machine.
The press used a piston to stretch aluminum pieces into a can. Occa-
sionally, the press jammed and had to be cleared of deformed cans
before continuing operations. Thursby's job was to do this. A door
guarded the area surrounding the piston. Inside was a limit switch
which stopped the machine while it was being cleared. However,
merely opening the guard door did not automatically do so. Proper pro-
cedure for clearing the machine required hitting two switches turning
off electrical power and oil to the press before opening the door and
hitting the limit switch. Thursby was injured when he forgot to turn off
the electrical switch before opening the guard door and hitting the limit
switch. Although the limit switch was activated, the piston still oper-
ated, injuring Thursby's hand. At trial, he presented proof that the
switch failed and that a defective design contributed to this. After a
defense verdict, Thursby claimed the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence that a fellow employee had examined the limit switch after
the accident and replaced it with another type the employee felt was
more reliable.
60. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 50, § 275, at 667, claiming that when a
third party makes the changes, "the policy ground for exclusion is no longer present."
Some courts allow third party changes and reject the argument these are implied ad-
missions. See, e.g., Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 210 (Wash. 1969) (evi-
dence that guard was installed the day after an accident admissible against manufac-
turer even though feasibility of design changes was not contested "since the
[manufacturer] did not make the changes . . . the fact such changes were made could
not conceivably raise . . . an inference ithe manufacturer] had admitted it was negli-
gent in not making the changes sooner").
61. 446 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Prior Florida law case law seemed to support Thursby's position
that section 90.407 does not apply when a non-party makes the subse-
quent measures. In Hartman v. Opelika Machine and Welding Co.,6 2
the same district court of appeal had allowed in evidence that plaintiff's
employer, who was not a party in the litigation, had made remedial
changes after plaintiff was hurt. The First District Court of Appeal
seemed to be adopting a general position in "upholding the admission
of such evidence when the change is made by one not a party to the
action." 63 However, in Thursby, the same court limited Hartman to the
unusual factual circumstances presented there. In Hartman, the de-
fendant introduced the evidence to place blame on the third-party em-
ployer for the accident, while in Thursby, the plaintiff attempted to use
the subsequent measures evidence to place blame on the defendant, as
would be the case in most lawsuits. The First District found the evi-
dence was being used to show Reynolds' negligence or culpability and
must be excluded by section 90.407. Unfortunately, the reasoning in
Thursby is very confusing. The court found that under Hartman the
evidence must still be relevant, no matter who made the subsequent
remedial measures. Since neither feasibility nor any other issue except
lack of negligence or culpability was controverted in Thursby, the First
District found evidence of the switch's replacement was irrelevant. Yet,
feasibility of repair would always seem to be relevant in a strict liabil-
ity case. Under Thursby's analysis, the fact that a third party took the
remedial action is immaterial. If evidence is irrelevant, it should not
come in at all - no matter who did the actions involved. Unfortu-
nately, Thursby's analysis confuses the relevancy issue with the policy
analysis behind excluding evidence of subsequent measures. Such mea-
sures are only admissible when controverted, but the reason for this is
not a lack of relevancy but a public7 policy desire to promote repairs.
Once a third party takes the remedial action, the public policy dis-
solves, but the relevancy of the evidence remains. Surely feasibility was
relevant, and no good reasons seem to require this issue to be contro-
verted when a third person not a party to the litigation takes the reme-
dial action.64 Hopefully, other Florida courts will not follow Thursby.
62. 414 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 426 So. 2d 27
(Fla. 1983).
63. 414 So. 2d at 1110.
64. The First District Court of Appeal further indicated its misunderstanding of
the policy behind excluding subsequent remedial actions by stating that the third-party
post-accident change could not "be attributed to Reynolds as an admission of pre-acci-
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2. Strict Liability Claims
Voynar v. Butler Manufacturing Co.,6 5 addressed the issue
whether section 90.407's subsequent remedial measure evidence should
apply to strict liability cases. A construction worker had stepped on an
unsecured roof panel which buckled underneath him causing the
worker to fall to his death. His widow sued the roof panel manufac-
turer in negligence and strict liability. After the fall, the manufacturer
took two steps which arguably could have prevented the death. First, it
attached warning flyers about where to walk on the panels to each bun-
dle of panels, rather than just having these in the instructions assembly
manual. Second, it changed the substance used to coat the panels for
shipping so that the new protective coating would begin evaporating
after exposure to air. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a
defense verdict, finding the evidence of these measures was properly
excluded. The court noted there is a split of authority about the admis-
sibility of subsequent measures.6 Although it acknowledged contrary
case law existed, Voynar held that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is not admissible in strict liability actions, as it is not in negli-
gence claims, unless an issue like feasibility of change is contested6 7 or
dent culpability . . . " 466 So. 2d at 249. Of course it could not be an admission by
conduct since Reynolds did not make the changes. However, Thursby never offered it
as such - only as evidence of the feasibility of a safer design!
65. 463 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla.
1985).
66. See e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P. 2d
1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Caprara v. Chrysler Co., 52 N.Y.S.2d 114, 417
N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981); Sirutaov. Hesston Corporation, 232 Kan. 654, 659
P.2d 799 (1983); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788 (8th
Cir. 1977) rejecting arguments that admission of subsequent measures evidence in
strict liability cases would discourage corrective measures; compare Cann v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied 456 U.S. 960 (1981), finding the
rationale behind excluding subsequent measures evidence in negligence claims is also
applicable to strict liability actions.
One completed study examining practical problems under the Federal Rules of
Evidence has concluded that the most significant issue concerning F.R. Evid. 407 is
"the application of the Rule to products liability actions, particularly when claims of
strict liability in tort (Restatement (second) of Torts § 402A) and breach of implied
warranty are alleged." See, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
126 AMER. BAR Assoc. SECTION OF LITIGATION (1983). The study recommended the
exclusionary approach to this issue.
67. FLA. STAT. § 90.047 (1985), unlike Fed. R. Evid. 407, contains no second
sentence which provides examples of issues, other than proving negligence or culpable
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the evidence would impeach an opposing witness. The court believed
defendants would be discouraged from making improvements if the op-
posite view was taken. Whether the case was a negligence or strict lia-
bility claim was immaterial. Strict liability in Florida does not make
manufacturers absolute insurers but only requires they not put an un-
safe product out. When events occur which demonstrate how an al-
ready "safe" product can be made even safer, manufacturers should
not be discouraged from taking such action. The court felt that an op-
posite ruling would make evidence of subsequent changes admissions of
fault and discourage their implementation."8
E. Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Florida Statute section 90.404(2) codifies what is often called by
its pre-code name, the "Williams" Rule. 9 This section prohibits the
introduction in a criminal case of evidence concerning the defendant's
other bad acts or crimes when the sole purpose is to show propensity.
However, when there is another legitimate purpose for the evidence,
evidence of bad acts may be admissible.7 0 This section drew more at-
tention in reported cases during the survey period than any of the other
conduct, for which subsequent measures would be admissible providing these issues are
controverted. However, the Florida courts have consistently adopted the Federal Rules
approach in this area. See Voynar, 463 So. 2d at 411.
68. The court relied heavily on Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th 'Cir.
1980) for its position. The Fourth Circuit's approach was the one specifically recom-
mended by the A.B.A.'s Federal Rules of Evidence study. See supra note 66.
Although no Florida decision expressly disagrees with Voynar, given the amount
of tort litigation in Florida courts, the Florida Supreme Court should consider defini-
tively resolving this question soon.
69. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 849
(1959).
Surprisingly, other crimes evidence has generated little discussion among Florida
evidence writers. For one of the few articles discussing this area, See Comment, Prior
Crime Evidence Admissible Only When Relevant to Crime Charged, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 197 (1974).
70. In such situations, FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b) requires the state to provide
the defense pre-trial notice of its intention to introduce other crimes evidence and pro-
vides for mandatory limiting instructions as to the evidence's purpose.
Like any other offerred information, other crimes evidence is always subject to
exclusion under the general provisions of FLA. STAT. § 90.403 that it may generate
"unfair prejudice" or cause "confusion of issues." As a practical matter, trial courts
are unlikely to use this provision to exclude other crimes evidence offerred for a non-
propensity purpose.
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relevancy rules. Not surprisingly, cases discussing other crimes evi-
dence also generated a high percentage of reversal. 1
Unfortunately, most Williams rule cases during this survey period
offer little significant discussion.7 2 Evidence of other crimes was found
erroneous when there was insufficient evidence to connect defendants
with the other crimes73 and when the other acts were not sufficiently
similar to be relevant to the crimes charged.7 4 However, several impor-
tant other crimes cases were decided during this time.
1. Williams Rule Errors Not State Caused
Brown v. State 5 presents an unusual fact situation which all pros-
ecutors should carefully note. The defendant, convicted of petty theft,
and another woman visited the victim's hotel room twice during one
day. Both times a second man was present. The second time the other
woman grabbed the victim's wallet and both women ran. The trial
judge granted a motion in limine preventing the victim from testifying
that on her first trip to the room, Brown had her arm around his friend
and it looked as if she were trying to get into the friend's pocket. On
cross-examination, defense counsel's questions forced the victim to ad-
mit that the woman who grabbed his wallet was not Brown. When
counsel then asked, "And, the only thing you saw that girl [Brown] do
was run?"170 the victim blurted out that he also saw her trying to get his
friend's wallet. Both the trial court and circuit court refused to find this
caused error since they believed the cross-examination had invited such
71. Five out of seventeen decisions found reversible error in admission of other
crimes evidence. A sixth found evidentiary error but also found it harmless.
Both the number of other crimes evidence opinions and the number of reversals
due to admission of other crimes evidence are apparently not unique to Florida. See
Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 12 Litigation 25, 67 (ABA Fall 1985).
72. In the following cases, treatment of Williams Rule issues is so summary that
one wonders why the courts even bothered to discuss the issue at all given the short
shrift it received. See Howard v. State, 471 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Lawson v. State, 470 So.
2d 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1985).
73. See, e.g., Diaz v. State, 467 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evi-
dence in a possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana case was insufficient to
connect defendant with marijuana found in his brother's car when there was no connec-
tion shown between the defendant and the car).
74. See McKinney v. State, 462 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
75. 472 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
76. Id. at 476.
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a response. The district court of appeal agreed with the trial court's
ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. However, it rejected the idea
that the doctrine of invited error precluded Brown from complaining
about the admission of the evidence. The court noted that when other
crimes evidence is relevant only to show propensity, the Florida Su-
preme Court has presumed the error harmful "because of the danger
that a jury will take the bad character of propensity to crime thus
demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged." Here the
error was clearly harmful since Brown's two previous trials for the
same offense produced hung juries. Accordingly, the district court re-
versed the conviction and remanded for future proceedings.
Brown, confined to its unusual circumstances, does make sense
even with the district court's cryptic opinion. As this was the third trial,
surely the victim-witness knew he was not supposed to bring this infor-
mation up. While reversing punishes the state for error it may not have
caused, making it bear this burden is fairer than having the defendant
do so. The state should have counseled the witness again before trial
about the court's ruling. Certainly after Brown, state attorneys will
have to be even more careful in preparing their witnesses so as to avoid
reversible error.
Unfortunately, Brown does not explain why the doctrine of invited
error did not apply.78 Thus, the opinion is not clear about what trial
courts should do in future similar situations. When witnesses blurt out
unexpected answers containing information about other crimes, which
is not properly relevant, is mistrial automatic? If the trial court had
immediately struck the evidence and given the jury proper instructions,
would mistrial still be merited?
Finklea v. State,7 9 while not factually identical to Brown, strongly
suggests that at least the First District Court of Appeal would adopt
the automatic mistrial position. Finklea and a co-defendant were
charged and tried jointly for robbing a Pensacola business. At trial, one
of the two victims could identify the co-defendant, but neither could
identify Finklea. The only testimony against Finklea came from his al-
77. Id. at 477 (citing Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981)).
78. The district court of appeal's sole statement on this point was that: "The
circuit court in its appellate review was clearly in error in affirming on a notion of
invited error. The petitioner had every right to claim error in the unsolicited and previ-
ously prohibited testimony .... The petitioner's motion for mistrial should have been
granted." Id.
79. 471 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
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leged admission to a third state witness. On cross-examination, the co-
defendant's attorney tried to force this witness to admit he had lied in
earlier deposition testimony. However, the witness unexpectedly
claimed he and counsel were "talking about two different robberies" s0
in which the defendants had been involved. Finklea's counsel objected
to the remark and moved for mistrial. After the court denied the mo-
tion, Finklea's attorney did not request a cautionary instruction. On
appeal, the district court found the failure to request the instruction did
not waive review since "the introduction of a prior unrelated criminal
act is too prejudicial for the jury to disregard.""'- Even though the state
had no part in eliciting the testimony, this did not lessen its effect; thus,
reversal was required.
Like Brown, Finklea could be read as approving automatic mis-
trial or reversal whenever other crimes evidence is wrongfully intro-
duced. However, the First District may have intended to still use a
harmless error approach, stating that the evidence "was unfairly preju-
dicial. This is especially true in light of the scant evidence in this case
relating to Finklea."82 Unfortunately, like in Brown, the court's cryptic
opinion leaves some doubt which approach the district court meant to
adopt.83 Hopefully, the Florida courts will adopt a harmless error ap-
proach when Finklea and Brown issues arise in the future. Since Flor-
ida courts sometimes will not reverse based on the harmless error doc-
trine when the state erroneously introduces the other crimes evidence,
it would be illogical to take an opposite stand when a defendant or co-
defendant does so.
2. Nolle Prosses and Williams Rule Evidence
When the defendant has been previously acquitted of charges in-
volving other crimes, many courts follow the United States Supreme
80. Id. at 597.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Emphasis added).
83. See also Howard v. State, 471 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
which can be read as meaning that the Fifth District would approve a harmless error
approach when a witness blurts out inadmissible other crimes testimony.
Like Brown and Finklea, Howard is an extremely short opinion. After reading the
Williams Rule cases during this survey period, this author is of the firm opinion that
appellate courts should either write fully reasoned and thoroughly explained opinions in
this area or not bother writing them at all.
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Court's decision in Ashe v. Swensons4 and bar the state from using
evidence about the acquitted crime in subsequent trials relating to dif-
ferent but similar charges.8 5 In Ashe the Court found that after a de-
fendant was acquitted of robbing one player at a poker game, collateral
estoppel prevented the state from subsequently charging him with rob-
bing the other players. The Court's examination of the first trial's evi-
dence showed that the jury must have found that Ashe was not the
robber. As this "issue of ultimate fact" 6 was once determined in a final
judgment, collateral estoppel prevented it from being tried again. How-
ever, even those courts following Ashe have not excluded other crimes
evidence where the prior acquittal was not based on the same issue
which the state subsequently wishes to use the other crimes evidence to
prove.87 In State v. Perkins,"8 the Florida Supreme Court seemed to
adopt this approach. To help convict Perkins of attempted rape on a
child, the state introduced testimony from another child who claimed
that Perkins had tried to use the same method, entering the bedroom
late at night, to rape her. However, Perkins had been tried for and
acquitted of this previous attack. The Florida Supreme Court noted
Ashe only prohibits "the admission in a subsequent trial of evidence of
an acquitted collateral crime only when the prior verdict clearly de-
cided in the defendant's favor the issue for which an admission is
sought."8 9 Since the issue in both charges seemed to be identity, the
court found that once the defendant was acquitted of the prior charge
it was "fundamentally unfair"90 to allow the state to introduce other
crimes evidence concerning this charge in a subsequent proceeding. Do-
ing so would force the defendant to defend himself a second time
against the charge for which he has once been acquitted. However, the
court left open the question whether evidence of collateral crimes for
which acquittals had not been obtained could be used.
84. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
85. See, e.g., State v. Irons, 230 Kan. 138, 630 P.2d 1116 (1981).
86. 397 U.S. at 443.
87. For cases in which a prior acquittal did not prevent use of other crimes evi-
dence see Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1979) (rape charge, previous
rape acquittals on consent defense stemming from same factual claims admissible to
show pattern or plan); State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 386 (1966) (charge of
intent to procure abortion, previous acquittal on similar charge did not prevent admis-
sions since evidence admissible to sh6w intent).
88. 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977).
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id.
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In Holland v. State,9 the Florida Supreme Court decided whether
evidence of a defendant's participation in a collateral offense which has
been nolle prossed could ever be admissible in a subsequent proceeding
on another charge. Holland was charged with the December 5, 1979,
armed robbery of a bank. His first conviction resulted in an acquittal
but was overturned because of error in the jury instructions.92 At Hol-
land's first trial the state introduced other crimes evidence through the
testimony of a bank employee who identified Holland as the person
who robbed her bank twelve days after the December 5th robbery. Fol-
lowing Holland's conviction, the state nolle prossed any charges relat-
ing to the December 17th robbery. After Holland's conviction was re-
versed, defense counsel moved to preclude state use of the crime's
evidence, because it had previously nolle prossed the charges relating to
the December 17th robbery. The trial court denied this motion and also
denied Holland's request to inform the jury that the collateral crime
charged had been nolle prossed. After his second conviction on the De-
cember 5th bank robbery charge, Holland appealed to the First District
Court of Appeal, which affirmed.93 However, the First District certified
the issue relating to the Williams Rule use of prior crimes for which
any charges have been nolle prossed as a question of great public im-
portance to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court refused to extend Perkins to the situa-
tion "where the defendant has been charged with the collateral offense
and subsequently had the charges dropped."94 Unlike a Perkins and
Ashe situation, the court felt that there was a major difference in using
other crimes evidence after a state nolle prosse as opposed to an acquit-
tal of prior charges. Since a nolle prosse does not necessarily mean that
the evidence of the other crime is weak or nonexisting, there is no fun-
damental unfairness when it is subsequently introduced against the de-
fendant in another trial. The Florida Supreme Court also felt that a
contrary ruling, given the procedural facts of Holland, would result in
an indefensible windfall to the defendant. During his first trial the De-
cember 17th charges were still pending. It was only after his first con-
viction that the state made the decision to drop these. Since his convic-
tion was overturned for reasons unrelated to the Williams Rule, a
decision now preventing the state from introducing evidence of the De-
91. 466 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1985).
92. Holland v. State, 400 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
93. Holland v. State, 432 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
94. 466 So. 2d at 207.
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cember 17th robbery would "unfairly prejudice the state's case."95
Holland is clearly a correctly decided case even apart from its un-
usual procedural circumstances. Other crimes evidence is commonly in-
troduced in criminal cases against the defendant even though the de-
fendant has not even been charged. Why the state should decide to
nolle pros a case often depends on matters unrelated to the strength of
the evidence. Holland provides a perfect example of this. After first
securing a conviction on the December 5th robbery, the state could rea-
sonably presume that Holland's sentence would not be extended by a
subsequent conviction on the December 17th robbery. Therefore, con-
sidering an expeditious use of prosecutorial and judicial resources, it is
difficult to fault the decision to drop the second prosecution. If Holland
had been decided differently, fear of reversals on appeal would man-
date that the state sometimes needlessly prosecute defendants for mul-
tiple charges even though it would not be in the overall public interest
to do so.
Certain language in the Florida Supreme Court's decision is troub-
ling however. The court notes that there is no indication that the state
dropped the charges because of matters involving how strong the evi-
dence was. Hopefully, the lower courts will not read this language to
mean that in subsequent cases involving the proposed admission of Wil-
liams Rule evidence relating to a nolle prossed charge, the defendant
has a right to inquire into the state's motive behind dropping the
charges. There are two good reasons for not doing so. First, this would
only introduce another issue and allow the defendant to perhaps divert
the jury's and the court's attention from the central issue of guilt or
innocence on the crime charged, rather than on a previous one. Sec-
ondly, assuming that the state did indeed drop the other crimes evi-
dence because proof of it was weak, then in most situations it would not
have been able to lay the correct factual predicate for the introduction
of other crimes evidence either.
The Florida Supreme Court never ruled expressly on Holland's
second point that assuming the other crime's evidence is admissible de-
spite the nolle prosse, then Holland should be allowed to testify that at
the time of his second trial he was not charged with the collateral of-
fense. Chief Justice Boyd, although concurring in the court's decision
that Perkins should not be extended to cover the situation involving
nolle prossed crimes, would have allowed the defendant to so testify.
95. Id. at 209.
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Justice Boyd felt that such a ruling was necessary because "the defend-
ant has a right to inform the jury of all the circumstances pertaining to
the evidence adduced against him."9 Fortunately, he was not able to
convince other members of the court on this point. If the court had
adopted Justice Boyd's reasoning, then the state may feel compelled to
offer explanations as to why defendants such as Holland were not
under charge for the other offenses. Once the state offered such rea-
sons, the defense would perhaps feel compelled to counter these reasons
or to cross examine the state about them. The jury might end up exam-
ining whether the decision to drop the other crimes charges was based
on a lack of evidence and whether that same lack of evidence could be
inferred over to the present case. Such a scenario would only introduce
collateral issues diverting the jury's attention from the central goal at
hand, the resolution of the criminal charges pending before it.
3. Miscellaneous Williams Rule Cases
The remainder of the cases discussing section 90.404(2) presented
rather standard issues. In all of them, the state used Williams Rule
evidence to prove such issues as intent 97 arid/or identity.98 Some of
these cases are not interesting enough to merit much discussion. The
others are briefly discussed below.
a. Identity
When other crimes evidence is used to prove identity, a multi-step
inferential process is used. First, there must be sufficient evidence to
connect the defendant with the other act or crime. Second, the other
crimes evidence must be unique. Third, the crime charged must also be
of the same unique character. From this, the inference drawn is that
the defendant is the one responsible for both unique acts or crimes.
When several crimes or attempted crimes are committed with an
unusual modus operandi, it is logical to infer the same individual is
96. Id. at 210.
97. See Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985); Hyer v. State, 462 So. 2d
488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zarate v. State, 466 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Bricker v. State, 462 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Randolph
v. State, 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985).
98. Smith v. State, 464 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Larkin v.
State, 474 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d
1277 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 870 (1986).
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involved each time. Smith v. State99 demonstrated the successful use of
other crimes evidence having an unusual modus operandi to prove
identity. Smith was charged for a first degree murder occurring by ar-
senic poisoning in 1975. At trial, the court admitted evidence of an
attempted arsenic poisoning murder which occurred in November,
1981. After conviction, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The
court noted that mere similarity between a collateral crime and one
charged is not enough to make the other crimes evidence admissible.
Rather, "there must be something so unique or particularly unusual
about the perpetrator or his modus operandi that it would tend to inde-
pendently establish that he committed the crime charged." 00 Smith
found arsenic poisoning to possess this unique quality. Unfortunately,
the court's opinion does not relate the circumstances connecting Smith
to both acts and what the evidence was, as to how the arsenic had been
given both times.10 1
An event like attempted arsenic poisoning almost has its own
stamp of uniqueness, perhaps explaining why the Smith court assumed
this without discussion. However, two quasi-ordinary events may be
shown to be so similar by the sheer number of common features they
share that inferring the same person was involved in both is perfectly
logical. In Larkin v. State,0 2 the defendant was charged with the gun-
point robbery of a Plantation pharmacy on August 12, 1983. The phar-
macist testified the robber came into the store, asked for something for
a sore throat and then drew a gun. The robber ordered that a "closed
for inventory" sign be put on the front door, after which he demanded
certain drugs be put in a garbage bag. He then took the watches and
wallets of the pharmacist and the pharmacist's father, took some
Timex watches from a display case, grabbed some Salem cigarettes and
99. 464 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
100. Id. at 1341.
101. Besides identity, the court found the other crimes evidence was also "rele-
vant to rebut appellant's defense that the victim committed suicide, and was introduced
to establish a pattern of criminality on the part of appellant." Id. How the evidence
rebutted a suicide defense is not explained. As to the notion that it established Smith's
"pattern of criminality", this may be another way of saying the evidence was admissi-
ble to prove identity through modus operandi. Arguably Smith may even be read as
not involving the use of other crimes evidence to prove identity but instead to prove a
common scheme or plan. Unfortunately, this case appears to be yet another example
where a court has so cryptically explained the reasons behind its decision and stated so
little facts that a clear understanding of the opinion is difficult.
102. 474 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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left. At trial, the state introduced evidence about the robbery of a
Deerfield Beach pharmacy after the Plantation robbery. The similari-
ties between the two robberies were numerous and striking. The Deer-
field Beach robber also ordered a "closed for inventory" sign be posted
on the door, demanded many of the same drugs, used a garbage bag to
carry the robbery proceeds, took the pharmacist's wallet and watches,
grabbed some Salem cigarettes and took additional Timex watches
from a display case. The pharmacist in the second robbery identified
Larkin as the perpetrator.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal correctly affirmed admission
of the Williams Rule evidence. Larkin had been linked to the other
crime; the other crime was of the same nature and close in time and
distance with the one charged. The method used by the robber in each
case, once the robbery actually began, was strikingly similar. Larkin
thus represents a classic use of other crimes evidence to show identity.
Indeed, a contrary decision would cast doubt on when other crimes evi-
dence could ever be so used. 103
b. Intent
Other crimes evidence was used to prove intent more than any
other issue. Like all use of other crimes evidence, this requires traveling
through a series of inferential steps. First, the defendant must be suffi-
ciently connected to the collateral crime evidence. Second, the two
events must be sufficiently similar so that the intent on both occasions
is logically the same. Third, the intent during the collateral crime must
be clearly demonstrated.
Bricker v. State'04 illustrates that where the intent during the col-
lateral act is not clear, Williams Rule evidence should not be admitted
to prove intent on another occasion. Otherwise, the jury would be faced
with evidence of two similar events where the intent both times is
equally ambiguous and, thus, not helpful. Bricker was a beauty salon
inspector, charged with bribery and receiving unauthorized compensa-
tion for official behavior. In fall 1982, Bricker told his supervisor he
103. Besides showing how other crimes may be used to prove identity, Larkin
and Smith are reminders that admissible other crimes evidence can occur either before
or after the act on trial. What is important is how strong a logical connection there is
between the collateral crime or act, the charge on trial and the proposition the other
crime evidence is being offered to prove at trial - not the time of the other act or
crime's commission.
104. 462 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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believed a salon owner had tried to bribe him. The supervisor advised
Bricker that unless he was actually given something nothing could be
done. A week later, Bricker went to a second salon where a discussion
of possible violation fines led the owner to believe Bricker was soliciting
a bribe and Bricker to believe the owner was attempting to offer him
one. At a second meeting between the two the owner actually gave
Bricker money. Unknown to the defendant, the owner had contacted
the state attorney's office after the first meeting and was wearing a
body wire the second time. Bricker was arrested with the money
outside the second salon. He told his supervisor he was trying to trap
the salon owner but was still fired and charged. At trial, the court ad-
mitted testimony from the first salon owner claiming Bricker tried to
solicit a bribe from him. After Bricker's conviction, the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed finding that while the crimes were similar
there was nothing "so unique or particularly unusual about the perpe-
trator or his modus operandi that it would tend to establish, indepen-
dently of an identification of him by the collateral crime victim, that he
committed the crime charged.' 0 5
In this author's view, the court correctly reversed but for the
wrong reasons. The Williams Rule evidence was not being offered to
prove identity, which is what the court's modus operandi discussion
really related to, but to prove intent. Certainly, the intent was at worst
ambiguous on both occasions. Indeed, a fair-minded person could even
say that with respect to the first salon, intent clearly was missing since
Bricker himself reported what he believed to be an attempted bribe.
After his supervisor's comments, his actions at the second salon could
be viewed as perfectly reasonable.
Randolph v. State'01 is the only other decision where the use of
other crimes evidence to prove intent received more than cursory atten-
tion. Randolph was charged with the first degree murder of a robbery
victim. At trial the state elicited testimony from Glinton, Randolph's
girlfriend, that she worked for Randolph as a prostitute and gave her
earnings to him. She testified that on the night of the homicide as she
was leaving a customer, Randolph ran up. and pushed her away. As she
left, Glinton heard Randolph warn her customer not to do anything.
Two gunshots followed. After the shooting, Randolph asked Glinton
about the victim and returned to the shooting scene after she told him
the victim had money. To prove intent, the state introduced evidence of
105. Id. at 559.
106. 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985) .
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another robbery two nights earlier. Randolph had robbed two victims
after Glinton had finished with them. On this earlier occasion he also
used a gun and was heard saying "he could have killed one of them
because he [the victim] didn't have any money.'101
While arguably his actions during the early crime do not reflect
his intent during the later homicide, since Randolph actually did not
shoot either victim, the Florida Supreme Court was probably correct in
admitting the other crimes evidence. Certainly, both incidents were
similar and Randolph participated in both. True, he did not shoot the
one earlier victim, but this may have been because the other victim on
that occasion did have money. During the later crime, Randolph appar-
ently had no idea the homicide victim had any money when he shot
him, or else why did Randolph find it necessary to ask Glinton about
this and return to the scene following her affirmative reply. Finally, the
mere fact that Randolph bothered to make the earlier statement during
the partially successful earlier robbery reflects his state of mind at that
time and that he had at least contemplated inflicting such "punish-
ment" should another potential victim be so unfortunate as to not have
any money.
IV. Privileges
A. Marital Communications Privilege
Florida, like many other states, recognizes a limited testimonial
privilege for the marital relationship. 10 8 Under Florida Statute section
107. Id. at 189.
108. Two marital privileges have been recognized in the United States. One is
the privilege for confidential marital communications, also called the husband-wife
communications privilege, which Florida evidence law recognizes. This privilege only
precludes one spouse from testifying about confidential communications between the
couple while they were married. The second is the spousal immunity or anti-marital
facts privilege. This "privilege" is actually a rule of competency since when applicable
it prevents one spouse from giving any testimony against the other spouse in a criminal
case, while the two are validly married. The holder of the spousal immunity privilege
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980), declaring that the witness-spouse rather than the defendant-spouse is the
appropriate holder of this privilege in federal criminal actions. For a critical review of
Trammel, see Lempert, The Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv. 725
(1981).
For a general discussion of Florida's Marital Privilege before passage of the Flor-
ida Evidence Code, see Hipler, Confidential Communications: Developments in Flor-
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90.504 either spouse in a marriage has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent the other spouse from disclosing confidential communi-
cations between the two during their marriage. 1 9 The privilege's pur-
pose is to foster communication between the spouses and, to a certain
extent, to protect the marriage relationship itself. Thus, the marital
privilege, like other privileges, deprives the trier of fact of information
which is often probative and trustworthy in order to foster relationships
which the law deems worthy of protection."10 Certainly there is a con-
stant tension between the notion that a jury or judge should be allowed
to hear all relevant evidence before making a decision and the notion of
excluding information because it is privileged. Recognizing this tension,
Florida law recognizes that matters which may be otherwise considered
confidential can be waived. Florida Statute section 90.5073" provides
that a privilege will be considered waived in three separate situations:
(1) when the holder "voluntarily discloses""' the communications; (2)
when the holder "consents to disclosure of any significant part of the
matter;" 113 or (3) when the holder makes the communication in a situ-
ida's Marital Privilege, 51 FLA. B.J. 697 (1977).
109. FLA. STAT. § 90.504 (1985) states in part that: "(1) A spouse has a privi-
lege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent an-
other from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence
between the spouses...
(2) the privilege may be claimed by either spouse ..
110. Since privileges work a disposition of evidence, Wigmore felt that four con-
ditions must be fulfilled before any valid privilege could be recognized:
(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that they would
not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would insure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 WIGMORE, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE § 2885 (3d ed.) (Emphasis in the original).
111. FLA. STAT. § 90.507 states in part that: "A person who has a privilege
against the disclosure of a confidential matter . . . waives the privilege if he, . . . vol-
untarily discloses or makes the communication when he does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any significant part of the matter or
communication."
112. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 116-117 for discussion of this
language.
113. Id.
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ation where "he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1"4
Koon v. State"5 was the only husband-wife privilege case decided
in this survey period. Koon was charged and convicted of first-degree
murder for killing a government informant who implicated him in a
counterfeiting scheme. Koon and his nephew allegedly lured the in-
formant Dino to a private place where they beat him and then took him
to a secluded rock pit in the Everglades. At the pit, Koon allegedly
ordered Dino to walk away with him from the car. He then killed Dino
with a shotgun. At trial, Koon's wife was forced to testify against her
husband despite an assertion of the husband-wife privilege. Mrs. Koon
testified that on the night of the alleged murder, Koon had telephoned
her and admitted the crime. The state successfully convinced the trial
court that since Koon had also told his mother-in-law and his son about
killing Dino, this constituted a waiver under section 90.507. However,
on appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding
that both spouses intended the telephone call to be privileged and
"made the communications when they had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. ' 1a6
Like so many other opinions during this survey period, Koon's dis-
cussion of the evidentiary issues is extremely brief. However, careful
reflection shows that the Florida Supreme Court was clearly correct.
Although Koon's admissions to his mother-in-law and son may at first
blush seem to constitute waivers under section 90.507, they were not.
Privileges protect the content of the confidential communications -
not the underlying information communicated itself. While section
90.507 uses the words "voluntarily discloses" with respect to a privi-
lege's holder, the words apply to "the disclosure of a confidential mat-
ter or communication" and not to any information about the underly-
ing event itself. Since Koon did not tell his mother-in-law and his son
about the contents of the confidential phone call conversation with his
wife, the marital communication was never voluntarily disclosed. What
was voluntarily disclosed was the fact of the killing, not the fact Dino
had told his wife about the killing. Forcing the wife to relate the phone
114. Id. For an article discussing pre-code Florida law concerning this issue see
Comment, Husband-Wife Privileges - Testimony of Third Party Eavesdropper Con-
cerning Privileged Communication Admissible Where Privileged Party Knows or Has
Reason To Know of Eavesdropper's Presence, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 553 (1976).
115. 463 So. 2d 201 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3511 (1985).
116. Id. at 204. Evidently the nephew was not present when Koon made the
telephone call to his wife since the court also found that "[n]o other party was present
at the time of the incriminating conversation between appellant and his wife" Id.
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conversation was error,117 although having the mother-in-law and son
testify about what Koon told them would not be.
B. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Florida Statute section 90.503 follows pre-code law by recognizing
a psychotherapist-patient privilege.11 The privilege prevents unwilling
disclosure of confidential communications between a patient, seeking
treatment or diagnosis, and a psychotherapist.11 9 Unlike other confiden-
tial communication privileges, this one extends beyond communications
between the parties and also covers records a psychotherapist would
make in the course of treatment and diagnosis. During this survey pe-
riod, section 90.503 generated more opinions than any other privilege.
While some were merely restatements of settled law,120 two important
cases were decided.
1. Child-Custody Cases and the Privilege
Section 90.503(4)(c) expressly provides that the privilege will not
be recognized "[f]or communications relevant to an issue of the mental
or emotional conditions of the patient in any proceeding in which he
relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense ... "
117. One pre-code case provides an example of what should still be considered
voluntary disclosure of a confidential matter. In Tibado v. Brees, 212 So. 2d 61 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), one spouse testified in a deposition about a confidential com-
munication with his wife. Since there was no objection at the deposition to this testi-
mony, the court considered it waived. Brees is certainly a correct decision. Communica-
tive privileges exist not merely to prevent admission of certain confidential
communications but to prevent their disclosure. Failure to take prompt steps to prevent
disclosure should be considered a waiver.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2) (1985).
119. FLA. STAT. § 90.503 protects not only treatment for what may be considered
standard mental or emotional problems but also for "alcoholism and other drug
addiction."
120. See Hall v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1985) (§ 90.503 prevents disclosure of hospital records
concerning defendant-driver's alcohol treatment when driver does not plan to use his
mental or emotional condition as a defense in automobile collision lawsuit), Connell v.
Guardianship of Connell, 476 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court
erred in excluding deposition testimony of doctor in competency restoration proceeding,
since § 90.503(4)(c) provides exception to exclusion when there is "an issue of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon
the condition as an element of his claim. .... ).
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This language is virtually identical to that in pre-code statutes gov-
erning the privilege. 21 Questions concerning this exclusionary language
seem to arise frequently in child custody proceedings. Since custody
awards are based on what is in the best interests of the child, an in-
quiry into the mental condition of one or both spouses may often ap-
pear needed. Depending upon the extent of such an inquiry, this could
lead to divulgence of medical records and communications with a
psychotherapist.
Pre-code Florida law rejected the position that merely asserting a
claim for child custody constitutes a waiver of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. In Roper v. Roper,'22 both parties sought custody in a
dissolution of marriage proceeding. The husband sought to depose the
wife's psychiatrist over his wife's objection. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal agreed that a patient's mental health "is a factor that the
Court can and should consider in determining the best interests of the
child."' 23 However, Roper refused to adopt the position that a spouse,
merely by seeking custody, waived any privilege claims to communica-
tions with a psychiatrist. The Fourth District admitted that "[t]he
wife's mental condition may become an issue in the case"124 but never
established any clear guidelines when this would result in the privi-
lege's waiver. The only concrete guidance Roper gave was that a
spouse's own introduction of communications with the psychiatrist to
prove mental condition would be construed a waiver. Since the wife
had not done so here, the husband had no right to depose her
psychiatrist. 12 5
Miraglia v. Miraglia'2 6 apparently exemplifies one of those rare
instances where a spouse's mental condition is not initially such an is-
sue that requesting custody automatically constitutes a waiver,' 27 but
121. See former FLA. STAT. §§ 90.424(3)(b) and 490.32(2)(b).
122. 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
123. Id. at 656.
124. Id.
125. Roper did suggest that the trial court under Fla. R.C.P. 3.160 could always
order an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist to explore a spouse's mental
status.
126. 462 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
127. During this survey period, the Fourth District Court of Appeal summarily
re-affirmed its position that merely requesting custody does not waiver the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. See Khairzdah v. Khairzdah, 464 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (quashing trial order denying protective order motion filed when husband
subpoenaed hospital record of wife's treatment during period prior to dissolution
1060 [Vol. 10
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where subsequent circumstances during the dissolution proceeding
make a waiver necessary. There the trial court awarded custody to the
wife and refused to admit testimony from her psychiatrist concerning
her mental condition. After the final judgment, the wife attempted sui-
cide and custody was transferred to the father. However, one week
later, the trial court returned the children to the wife and denied the
father's petition for rehearing. One reason for awarding the wife cus-
tody was to "help her resolve admitted emotional problems."'1 28 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal found this an impermissible basis since
it would effectively put the mother's best interests over that of the chil-
dren. The Fourth District agreed that the court's initial decision ex-
cluding the wife's psychiatrist's testimony was correct. However, when
the wife subsequently attempted suicide, this made her mental health a
vital issue as to who should be awarded permanent custody. Thus, on
remand, the husband would be able to introduce the psychiatrist's testi-
mony over an assertion of privilege.
Miraglia is certainly a correct decision. If the wife's subsequent
suicide attempt did not put her mental condition in issue, it would be
difficult to see what would. However, why an event reflective of a
spouse's mental status which occurs subsequent to a custody request is
any more reflective than one which occurs before is puzzling. The
Roper-Miraglia line of cases demonstrate the need for an explicit ex-
ception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in custody cases. Even
Roper admitted mental status was important to inquire into in deter-
mining custody. Then why should such extremely relevant evidence be
excluded? Florida law refuses to recognize other confidential communi-
cations privileges where children may be concerned. 29 One argument
against such an exception may be that the parties would try to intro-
duce any and all evidence of mental or emotional treatment no matter
how far removed. However, trial courts consider remoteness in ruling
on the relevancy of all evidence, and there appears to be no reason why
such a consideration would not keep out the truly irrelevant psychiatric
data in custody proceedings any less than it would in other cases. If
Florida truly wants to make custody determinations in the best inter-
ests of the children, legislative action creating such an exception is
merited.
proceeding).
128. 462 So. 2d at 507.
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.52 (1985) discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 131-134.
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2. Communications Made Under Court Order Exception
Miraglia construed one exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The privilege also does not apply to "communications made
in the course of a court-ordered examination of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient."'130 Such communications probably most often
occur when a defendant claims insanity and the court orders an
examination.
In Carson v. Jackson,13' parents brought a negligence and child
abuse action against a babysitter and her husband. The babysitter had
previously pled nolo contendere to a battery charge in a criminal case
unconnected with the parents' suit. She had been placed on probation
under the condition she would not babysit again until she was "ex-
amined and found fit by a psychologist."' 3 2 To comply with this, both
spouses saw a psychologist. As part of discovery, the plaintiffs sought to
either depose the psychologist or have his records produced. After the
trial court denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, they
appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the babysitter's
privilege claim stating that it did "not believe that the petitioners' visit
to a psychologist under a plea agreement relating only to the continua-
tion of doing business constitutes a 'court-ordered examination' "1133
under the psychotherapist-patient privilege's exception. Unfortunately,
the court never stated why it adopted this belief. Possibly the court
meant to distinguish between court-ordered examinations which are di-
rectly necessary to secure information in a pending proceeding and
court-ordered examinations which are merely incidental in nature to a
court proceeding. Whatever its reasoning, the court should have ex-
plained its ruling in this part of Carson so that trial courts could be
given some guidance on this point.
However, even with the Fourth District's ruling on the psychother-
apist-patient issue, the babysitter-defendants still were a denied a pro-
tective order. Carson noted that Florida Statute section 415.512 ex-
pressly abrogates all statutory privileges except for attorney-client
communications in "any situation involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect" and provides that a privilege claim is not a ground
130. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(b) (1985).
131. 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
132. Id. at 1190.
133. Id.
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for "failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child
abuse or neglect. 1 34 The defendants urged that section 415.512 should
be construed to apply only to proceedings brought by the State Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services. They claimed that one
purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to encourage individ-
uals in need of treatment to seek such and that applying section
415.512 to abrogate the privilege beyond a HRS proceeding would dis-
courage people from seeking voluntary treatment.
The Fourth District recognized the defendants' argument that sec-
tion 90.503's purpose was valid. However, the court assumed the legis-
lature had weighed the need to encourage individuals to voluntarily
seek treatment, versus the need to deter child abuse by permitting the
broad introduction of evidence in abuse related cases in civil lawsuits
for damages. Thus, the Fourth District found section 415.512 required
rejection of defendant's privilege claim.
In the author's view, the court was correct in its construction of
section 415.512. Besides this, factually the babysitters should not have
been given the benefit of a claim that an opposite construction was
needed to voluntarily encourage people to seek mental care. Here the
wife sought psychological help under a court order as a part of her
probation, so her visit for treatment was clearly not voluntary.
C. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Both the United States and Florida Constitutions recognize that
all individuals have a privilege against self-incrimination.1 35 Most dis-
cussions of these privileges occur in the context of addressing the ad-
missibility of confessions or incriminating statements in criminal cases,
an area beyond this article's scope. However, the courts have recog-
134. FLA. STAT. § 415.512 (1985) states in part:
Aborgation of privileged communications in cases involving child abuse or
neglect. - The privileged quality of communication between husband and
wife and between any professional person and his patient or client, and any
other privileged communication except that between attorney and client
shall . . . not apply to any situation involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report, ...
or failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child
abuse or neglect.
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, and FLA. CONST. § 9, Declaration of Rights
(both providing in part that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.").
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nized that the privilege also extends to civil and administrative
proceedings.
Boedy v. Department of Public Reguldtion 86 recently afforded the
Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit the privilege against
self-incrimination's applicabilty to professional regulatory proceedings.
The Department filed an administrative complaint against Boedy pur-
suant to the Medical Practice Act. 13 7 The complaint alleged Boedy suf-
fered from a mental or emotional condition making him "unable to
practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety"' 38 under Florida
law. Pursuant to its complaint the Department ordered Boedy to sub-
mit to a series of psychiatric examinations, the results of which would
be used to determine his fitness to continue practicing medicine. When
a Department hearing officer denied his claim that the examinations
would violate his privilege against self-incrimination, Boedy appealed to
the First District Court of Appeal"3 9 and then to the Florida Supreme
Court, both of which also rejected his privilege argument. Since the
supreme court relied heavily on the district court's opinion, a review of
both is necessary.
The First District Court of Appeal carefully phrased the issue as
whether the "privilege against compelled self-incrimination is applica-
ble in the circumstances of this case."40 The answer depended on
whether the practical effect of the proceedings could be considered pe-
nal in nature. The court acknowledged that the Florida courts had
found the privilege applicable to Florida Real Estate Commission pro-
ceedings investigating allegations of misconduct' 4 ' and to State Board
of Medical Examiners investigation of unprofessional conduct
claims. 4 ' In both cases, sanctions were sought for the unprofessional
136. 463 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1985).
137. FLA. STAT. § 4358.301-349 (1985).
138. FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1)(s) (1981).
139. 444 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
140. Id. at 505 (Emphasis added).
141. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487
(Fla. 1973). The misconduct allegations included the following: failure to maintain
trust funds in an escrow account; breach of trust and dishonesty in a business dealing;
failure to obtain a new registration certificate or otherwise tell the Commission about
an office address change; sharing offices with an attorney in violation of a Commission
Rule; and a general charge that Vining's past conduct showed he was so incompetent
and dishonest a client's money or property could not be trusted to him.
142. See Lester v. Department of Prof. and Occ. Regulations, 348 So. 2d 923
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (involving allegation of receiving kickbacks from a hos-
pital where the physician's patient had received services).
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conduct alleged. The First District contrasted these situations with that
in Boedy. The Department of Professional Regulation admittedly
sought to at least temporarily curtail the doctor's ability to practice
medicine, but this happened because his ability was impaired not be-
cause Boedy had engaged in professional misconduct meriting discipli-
nary action. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated when
a proceeding is for the purpose of assessing a civil penalty rather than a
criminal one.143 Examining the factors the United States Supreme
Court used in Kennedy v. Mendora-Martinez 1 4  to determine whether a
penalty was criminal or civil in nature, the First District summarily
concluded that the Department's proceeding against Boedy did not seek
to impose a criminal penalty; thus, he had no privilege to refuse the
examinations. However, the court certified the question to the Florida
Supreme Court as one of great public importance.1 45
In a brief opinion, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Like the
First District, the supreme court found the specific section of the Medi-
cal Practice Act involved in Boedy "does not deal with an issue of guilt
or innocence. ' ' 146 No misconduct charges or the possibility of any pen-
143. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
144. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Court listed the factors as:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment, . . . whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ..
Id. at 168-169.
145. The exact question certified was: "Whether the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination applies to disciplinary proceedings initiated under
section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, to determine whether a physician is unable to
practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients as a result of a mental or
physical condition." Boedy, 444 So. 2d at 504.
146. 463 So. 2d at 217. The court relied on Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1970) where a defendant claiming insanity as a
defense refused to answer questions at a court ordered psychiatric evaluation. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination would not be vio-
lated by requiring a defendant to answer questions in a psychiatric interview since any
statements of the accused could only be properly used as evidence of mental status and
not for the factual truth of the statements themselves. Indeed, Parkin specified that the
state should only elicit the experts' opinion "as to sanity or insanity, and should not
inquire as to information concerning the alleged offense provided by a defendant during
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alty for misconduct were involved in a section 458.331(1)(s) proceed-
ing. Rather the sole issue is a doctor's fitness to practice medicine
"with reasonable skill and safety." The state clearly had a great inter-
est in certifying and making sure that persons engaging in a profes-
sional discipline are physically and mentally able to do so. Since there
is no absolute right to practice medicine free from any reasonable regu-
lation, Boedy could not refuse the ordered psychiatric evaluations and
continuing practicing. As long as the state did not seek to use anything
Boedy might say during the evaluations against him in later criminal
proceedings, there was no valid privilege claim. Since section
458.331(1)(s) prohibited such, this was not a bona fide issue.147 The
Florida Supreme Court thus found it "constitutionally permissible to
deny authority to practice medicine to a physician who asserts the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination if his claim has prevented full assess-
ment of his fitness and competence to practice. 11 48
V. Compulsory Process
In a criminal case, the United States and Florida constitutions
guarantee the accused the right to subpoena witnesses to testify for the
defendant. 49 The Compulsory Process Clause has been construed as
affording an accused the right to present a defense free from arbitrary
his interview ... " id. at 820.
The Florida Supreme Court found that the examination in Boedy like that in Par-
kin, was not related to "guilt-in-fact", 463 So. 2d at 217, but to the presence or ab-
sence of a mental condition. This author believes the analogy drawn to Parkin is both
strained and unnecessary. To claim that the Parkin examination was not related to
"guilt-in- fact" is sophistry. If Parkin was insane at the time she committed the alleged
criminal acts, she was not "guilty-in-fact" because she did not possess the requisite
mental status! At any rate, once the Florida Supreme Court found that Boedy's pro-
ceeding did not seek to impose a criminal penalty, there should have been no need to
even draw such an analogy.
147. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(1)(s) specifically stated that: "[I]n any proceeding
under this paragraph, neither the record of proceedings nor the orders entered by the
board shall be used against a physician in any other proceeding."
148. 463 So. 2d at 218.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in part that: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right ...to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor. . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 16, Declaration of Rights, states that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused. . .shall have the right to compulsory pro-
cess for witnesses. .. ."
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and unreasonable state evidentiary rules. 150 In State v. Montgomery,151
the Third District Court of Appeal resolved a conflict between an ac-
cused's right to present a defense and a proposed defense witness' legit-
imate claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. More specifi-
cally, the court decided whether a trial court can override the state's
objection to giving a witness use immunity.
Montgomery was charged with various offenses, including resisting
arrest, grand theft, and battery of a law enforcement officer. He
claimed that a person named Downey had been present, had seen the
incident giving rise to the charges and could give exculpatory informa-
tion. Downey refused to testify unless immunized. When the state did
not offer immunity, Montgomery asked the trial court to immunize
Downey anyway, which the court did over state objection.
The district court noted that Montgomery was a case of first im-
pression in Florida. The court found there were two kinds of defense
witness immunity - statutory and judicial. Statutory immunity is
"granted by the legislature to the executive branch through statute
which gives a prosecutor authority to confer immunity on a witness in
return for the witness' self-incriminating testimony.' 1 52 Traditionally,
the decision to confer this lies with the state. However, the district
court found that when prosecutorial misconduct interferes with a de-
fendant's constitutional rights to present a defense, statutory immunity
can be used as a remedy to avoid a court ordered acquittal. Thus, when
the prosecution so threatens a defense witness with possible criminal
charges that the witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
instead of testifying 53 or when the prosecution intentionally refuses to
grant immunity as a matter of trial strategy to keep exculpatory evi-
dence out,154 statutory immunity has been recognized as possible appro-
priate action. However, even so, the recognition of statutory immunity
does not make its use mandatory. Since the executive has the authority
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) holding that a state
statute prohibiting persons charged as accomplices from being witnesses for each other
violated a defendant's compulsory process rights since it "arbitrarily denied him the
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testify-
ing to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense." Id.
151. 467 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
152. Id. at 390.
153. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1976).
154. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir.
1980).
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to decide whether statutory immunity is appropriate, even in instances
of prosecutorial misconduct, the state still maintains that residual
power. If the state wishes to continue prosecution when its misconduct
has interfered with the defendant's constitutional right to call a wit-
ness, the state must grant the immunity or suffer dismissal. But the
state must decide which choice is appropriate, not the trial court.
Since a dismissal is such a drastic remedy, Montgomery found
that the defense has the burden of showing the state intentionally at-
tempted to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by interfering with the
right to call a witness. 155 Unfortunately for Montgomery, the record
did not reflect this. The district court refused to accept the position that
when the state declines to immunize a defense witness, the lack of any
present intention to prosecute the witness is per se evidence of miscon-
duct. Thus while the court recognized statutory immunity as a viable
remedy, this was not an appropriate occasion for it.
As an alternative to statutory immunity, Montgomery also argued
the theory that judicial immunity should exist whenever "the defendant
is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to
his defense"' 56 despite the lack of prosecutorial misconduct. Under this
theory, judicial immunity is part of a court's inherent power to see that
a defendant's rights are fulfilled. Unlike statutory immunity which has
been favorably recognized by many courts and some commentators, 5 "
the district court found only the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit favorably recognized judicial immunity. 58 Since granting
immunity is a traditional executive decision, respect for the separation
of powers doctrine has driven many courts away from recognizing judi-
cial immunity. Furthermore, the time and information needed for a
155. "The defendant must be prepared to show that the government's decisions
were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process."
467 So. 2d at 391 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
156., 467 So. 2d at 392-393.
157. See Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to
Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266, 1280 (1978) concluding that the "right to
compulsory process guaranteed by the sixth amendment requires the State to grant use
immunity to defense witnesses when doing so would not create significant burdens for
the state;" Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 170 (1980)
arguing that "[o]nce the state makes immunity available to the prosecution it should
not be permitted arbitrarily to withhold it from the defense."
158. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
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court to intelligently assess when judicial immunity is appropriate
would lead to both "significant expenditures of judicial energy to the
detriment of the judicial process overall, and would risk jeopardizing
the impartiality of the judge at trial. ' 59
Against these two reasons for declining to recognize judicial im-
munity, Montgomery again sought to utilize a compulsory process
clause argument. However, the district court declined to, recognize
such. The clause gives defendants the right to subpoena witnesses and
have their testimony heard free from prosecutorial conduct which
would merit granting statutory immunity. However, "it does not carry
with it the additional right to displace a proper claim of privilege, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination."'' 0 Thus, Montgomery
had no valid compulsory process clause claim to judicial immunity for
his witness. 6'
Ultimately, the district court found that only when there is suffi-
cient prosecutorial misconduct can a court become involved in an im-
munity decision. Even then the ultimate choice between dismissal or
immunity still remains with the state. 62
VI. Cross-Examination and Impeachment
Of the fourteen cases decided in late 1984 and 1985 that this sur-
vey will discuss that deal with cross-examination and impeachment, all
but one of them are criminal cases. The first four cases involve rever-
sals as a result of trial courts' improperly restricting the cross-examina-
tion by defendants of the main witnesses for the state.
A. Prior Conviction
Belton v. State'63 involved a reversal of a defendant's conviction
because "the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of the
159. 467 So. 2d at 394.
160. Id.
161. In so denying the claim, the district court noted a possible third policy rea-
son why judicial immunity should not be recognized. This is the fear that co-defendants
would intentionally try to create situations where they could utilize perjured testimony
to mutually help each other, under the protection of use immunity.
162. Montgomery specifically adopted the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's posi-
tion on statutory immunity. Counsel interested in seeing whether such immunity is
necessary should consult this circuit court's decisions as well as future Florida ones.
163. 475 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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State's principal witness . . . by precluding cross-examination with re-
spect to an out-of-state conviction."'" 4 The out-of-state conviction in
Belton was the crime of joy-riding which, while punishable by ninety
days imprisonment, was a crime considered in both Michigan and Flor-
ida to involve a dishonest act, and therefore a crime with which a wit-
ness could be impeached under section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes. 6 5
B. Bias
In Yolman v. State, 6' the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed a trial court's ruling that had prohibited the defendant on cross-
examination from impeaching a state witness as to that witness' bias.
The appellate court held that "[ilt is not necessary for matters tending
to show bias or prejudice to have been within the scope of the direct
examination to be proper cross-examination."11 7 The appellate court
also found that the trial court's error in not permitting the defendant to
cross-examine the key state witness concerning that witness' bias or
prejudice "was not made harmless by related testimony of appellant's
husband, who was also co-defendant, and who had little credibility with
the jury."'1 8 Furthermore, had the defendant taken advantage of the
trial court's offer to permit the defendant to call the state's key witness
as defendant's witness, defendant "would have been wrongfully de-
prived of her concluding closing argument .... This deprivation alone
may have been reversible error."' 69
The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was error in Woo-
ten v. State17 0 not to permit a defendant to cross-examine a victim
about the victim's having hired an attorney in contemplation of filing a
civil suit against the defendant's employer.
A rare instance of an Anders' brief leading to a reversal of a
guilty verdict is Jackson v. Florida. 2 Jackson involved an appeal of a
theft conviction that resulted from the defendant's refusal to turn over
164. Id.
165. The Third District cited State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1984) for the
proposition that the crime was an act involving dishonesty.
166. 469 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
167. Id. at 843.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 844.
170. 464 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
171. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
172. 468 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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a customer's payments, for work done on the customer's car, to the
victim car repair shop. The defendant maintained that he was an inde-
pendent contractor paying rent to the car repair shop plus 50% of the
profits, while the owner of the car repair shop claimed that the defend-
ant was an employee who received a commission and did some indepen-
dent contracting. The trial court had refused to permit the defendant to
cross-examine the victim (the owner of the car repair shop and the
state's main witness) about the victim's having made romantic ad-
vances to the defendant's girlfriend. The defendant had also proffered
the testimony of another employee who would have testified that the
victim had made romantic advances to her as well and that the victim
had promised to "get even" with the defendant. Saying that this was
improper impeachment of the victim's character, the trial court had not
permitted the proffered testimony.173 However, the trial court was re-
versed as the proffered questions dealt with the victim's bias and "a
trial judge should allow the defendant to inquire of the witness via
cross-examination of the witness's bias."174
C. Permitted Restrictions on Cross-Examination
The next three cases deal with permissible limitations on defend-
ants' cross-examination of state witnesses.
1. Prior Consensual Sex Acts
Marr v. State 75 involved an appeal from a trial court's limiting
defendant's cross-examination of a rape victim's prior consensual sex-
ual acts. The victim in Marr claimed that the defendant had forced her
to undress and perform oral sex, but that after she bit the defendant's
penis and escaped, she did not notify anyone until, after receiving sev-
eral threatening phone calls and being assaulted outside of her home,
she contacted the police. The defendant sought to cross-examine the
victim about her prior consensual sexual acts with her boyfriend, but
was only permitted by the trial judge to elicit from both the victim and
the victim's boyfriend that their relationship was close and loving with-
173. Id. at 348.
174. Id. at 349. An interesting side note is that Jackson was a non-jury trial, so
the trial court heard all the excluded evidence as a proffer. The appellate court as-
sumed that: "[T]he trial court honored its own evidentiary ruling, and thus refused to
consider the proffered testimony. . . ." Id.
175. 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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out reference to any specific sexual acts. 176 The appellate court found
no error in the trial court's ruling but reversed the conviction on other
grounds.
2. Pending Charges
In Francis v. State,71 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court's having restricted the defendant's cross-examination of two state
witnesses against him. Francis involved the third first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence (the previous two had been reversed) of
the defendant for a 1975 murder. The trial court had prohibited the
defendant from cross-examining one witness regarding pending murder
charges against that witness. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's ruling that the witness' pending murder charge was irrele-
vant. The defendant had proffered neither what the witness' answers
would be to his proposed questions nor how those answers would be
relevant, other than to show that the witness had a bad character or a
propensity towards violence, neither of which is permissible. Further-
more, the state alleged that no deals had been made with that witness
and that witness had indeed later been convicted of the second degree
murder of her husband. 178
3. Witness' Job Performance
In affirming another first-degree murder conviction and death sen-
tence, the Florida Supreme Court in Rose v. State7 9 found no error in
the trial court's restricting defendant's cross-examination of a police
detective. The defendant "wanted to bring out the level of professional-
ism of Detective Luchan for the purpose of determining his credibil-
ity."' 80 However, since section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes does not
permit an attack on one's professionalism as a way of attacking credi-
bility, the Florida Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's
discretion in restricting the defendant's cross-examination.181
176. Id. at 705.
177. 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985).
178. Id. at 674. One wonders if the result would have been the same had the
defendant proffered that the questioning would have shown that the witness' motive for
testifying might have been leniency in her own case.
179. 472 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1985).
180. Id. at 1157.
181. Id. at 1158.
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D. "Impeachment" of One's Own Witness
In two cases, appellate courts held that it was not impeachment
and therefore not improper for the state to bring out the weaknesses of
its own witnesses on direct examination, thereby weakening defendant's
subsequent cross-examination. Sloan v. State"8 2 involved an appeal
from a conviction of burglary and grand theft. During direct examina-
tion of its own witness, a co-perpetrator, the state elicited that its wit-
ness had given a prior inconsistent statement. The Second District
Court of Appeal held that this was not an attempt by the state to im-
peach its own witness, "but rather to bolster his credibility by revealing
his earlier inconsistent statements."1 83
Adopting a reasoning that is sounder than the dicta of a previously
decided Fourth District Court of Appeal case, 1 4 the Second District
Court of Appeal in Bell v. State'86 ruled consistently with Sloan, 8"
that it was permissible for the state on direct examination of its own
witness to bring out that the witness had previously lied under oath.
The appellate court found no merit to the defendant's contention that
the state was attempting to impeach its own witness.
In contrast to the well-reasoned Second District Court of Appeal
opinions in Sloan and Bell, a bad evidentiary ruling from Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal is Price v. State.8 7 Price involved a re-
trial of a defendant accused of a narcotics offense; the first trial had
ended in mistrial. During the retrial, a state witness testified that the
defendant had given her quaaludes, testimony that was inconsistent
with that witness' testimony at the first trial, during which the witness
testified that she had not received drugs from the defendant. Over de-
fendant's objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor on direct
examination to let his witness explain the prior inconsistent testimony
and the reason for it - that the witness had been threatened by the
defendant. Reasoning that the prosecutor was trying to rehabilitate his
witness before that witness had been impeached and that this is tanta-
mount to attacking the credibility of one's own witness which is prohib-
ited by section 90.608, Florida Statutes, the appellate court in Price
reversed the defendant's conviction. An explanation for the Fifth Dis-
182. 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
183. Id. at 490.
184. Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
185. 473 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
186. 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
187. 469 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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trict Court of Appeal's error here may be that the appellate court did
not understand that the prosecutor was not impeaching his own wit-
ness, but rather was attempting to bolster the credibility of that
witness.1 88
However, it is error for the prosecution to elicit on direct examina-
tion that the state's witness has never been convicted of a crime: the
witness must first be impeached by the defense. Such was the ruling of
Mohorn v. State.189 However in that case, the error was not reversible,
in light of "[t] he totality of the evidence against the defendant, includ-
ing her admission of guilt. ..."1,0
E. Opening the Door on Direct
In two cases, the state's otherwise impermissible questioning was
permitted because the defendant had opened the door on his direct ex-
amination. Jefferson v. State91 involved an appeal from a manslaugh-
ter conviction. The appellate court affirmed a trial court's ruling that
permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant on defendant's fail-
ure "to subpoena two competent and available witnesses where the de-
fendant's own presentation of testimony had indicated that these wit-
nesses could exonerate him."1 92
In affirming a conviction for sexual battery and burglary, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal in Ashcraft v. State"'3 held that the trial
court properly allowed cross-examination of the defendant by the state
into the details of the defendant's prior crimes. During his direct exam-
ination, the defendant referred to his prior crimes and stated "that he
had never hurt anyone during those prior crimes." 94 Consequently, the
trial court permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant about a
prior rape conviction.
188. While it may be merely coincidental, one notes in passing that the Fifth
District Court of Appeal is the only one of Florida's appellate districts which does not
have a law school in its district. On the other hand, Stetson Law School is located
within the boundary of the Second District Court of Appeal, whose evidentiary rulings
in Sloan and Bell were correctly decided.
189. 462 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
190. Id. at 82.
191. 471 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
192. Id. at 182.
193. 465 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
194. Id. at 1375.
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F. Illegally Obtained Confessions
Where a confession has been ruled coerced and involuntary, that
confession may not be used to impeach a defendant who takes the
stand and tells a different story. Hawthorne v. State95 involved an ap-
peal from a manslaughter conviction, the defendant's third trial,1 98 in
which the trial court had permitted the state to impeach the defendant
on cross-examination by using the defendant's prior statement that had
been illegally obtained. The fact that the state did not refer to the pre-
viously suppressed statement did not save the impeachment attempt
since the state used information from the previously suppressed state-
ment to impeach the defendant.
1. The Civil Case
The one civil case involved two issues of improper impeachment
which the trial court permitted and one instance of permissible im-
peachment as to bias.
G. Sequestration Rule Violation
Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon197 was a suit by an employee
against shipowners for injuries which the employee said occurred in an
accident on one of defendant's ships. The defendant's main witness, the
captain of the ship, was required to wait outside of the courtroom dur-
ing testimony of the other witnesses. A woman friend of the captain
would watch some of the testimony in court and then come out and sit
by and talk to the captain. The appellate court ruled that the trial
court improperly permitted plaintiff's attorney to impeach the captain
(defendant's witness) regarding this supposed violation of the Seques-
tration Rule without a prior determination by the judge that the Rule
had been violated. The appellate court held that before cross-examina-
tion of a witness regarding a violation of the Sequestration Rule would
be permitted, the court must first make a determination that the Rule
had been violated. 98
The appellate court in Del Monte also held that it was improper to
195. 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
196. The first trial had resulted in a conviction for murder in the first degree and
the second trial had ended in a conviction for murder in the second degree.
197. 466 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
198. Id. at 1171..
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permit cross-examination of the captain insinuating that the captain
had been fired because of plaintiff's injury, since there had been no
proof that the captain was fired, merely that the captain had left the
job with defendant for another job. "It is axiomatic that counsel cannot
ask questions of a witness that have no basis in fact and are merely
intended to insinuate the existence of facts to a jury."' 99
On the other hand, the appellate court approved the trial court's
having permitted the plaintiff to cross-examine the captain as to bias
and party alignment, specifically by inquiring into the fact that before
the trial, the captain had been rehired by defendant company as a mate
and promised a position as a captain as soon as that position opened up.
VII. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statements
The nine cases which deal with impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements are all criminal cases. In a pair of cases, discussed above,
Sloan v. State and Bell v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal
permitted the state on direct to bring out and have the state witnesses
explain prior inconsistent statements, thereby stealing the thunder of
defendant's cross-examination of those witnesses. In Price v. State, crit-
icized above, the Fifth District Court of Appeal refused to permit the
state witness to explain during direct examination a prior inconsistent
statement.
Technically, neither Sloan nor Bell nor Price - the Fifth District
Court of Appeal notwithstanding - concern impeachment by prior in-
consistent statements.
In a case involving the question of what use can be made of a
witness who recants his testimony before trial, the First District Court
of Appeal in Austin v. State,00 severely restricted the prosecution's use
of a witness' unsworn prior statement that incriminated the defendant.
After reversing a robbery conviction on other grounds, the court in
Austin also addressed improper use of a witness' unsworn prior state-
ments. During the defense side of the case, the defense called a witness
who claimed to have been with the defendant and a state witness at a
time when the state witness claimed the defendant had made admis-
199. Id. at 1172. While the defendant didn't raise it as a ground for objection
either at trial or on appeal, the appellate court noted that had the captain actually been
fired, that might have been a prohibited line of inquiry as a subsequent remedial mea-
sure under FLA. STAT. § 90.407. Id. at 1173 n.5.
200. 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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sions. The defense witness maintained that he did not hear the defend-
ant make any admissions.20 1 The defense to the robbery charge was
that the defendant had been in Georgia for about one week before the
robbery was committed in Jacksonville. On rebuttal, the prosecution
asked the court to call as a court witness the defense witness previously
mentioned. Since the defense witness claimed to have no memory of
just when he was with defendant on Jacksonville Beach, the court per-
mitted the prosecution to elicit from the defense witness that the de-
fense witness had previously told an assistant state attorney and an in-
vestigator that the defense witness and the defendant had been together
on Jacksonville Beach one day before the robbery. The appellate court
made the distinction between the witness who was hostile, which this
defense witness certainly was, and one who was adverse, distinguishing
between the witness whose testimony is not beneficial and the witness
who gives testimony that is prejudicial to the cause of the party calling
him. 20 2 In the instant case, the defense witness' testimony was not ad-
verse, even though the defense witness himself may have been hostile to
the state. Consequently, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
had erroneously permitted the prosecutor to get around section 90.608
of the Florida Statutes, which requires a showing of adversity before a
prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach a witness. More-
over, the appellate court ruled that even had the prosecutor been per-
mitted to impeach the defense witness, the prior inconsistent statement
would only have come in for impeachment and not as substantive evi-
dence since the prior statement had not been under oath.203
A conviction for trafficking in cannabis was reversed in Williams
v. State2 0 4 because the trial court refused to permit defendant to im-
peach the state's main witness by a prior inconsistent statement. The
trial court had erroneously ruled that since the prior inconsistent state-
ment had been an oral statement, impeachment would not be permit-
ted. In reversing, the appellate court stated:
The prior inconsistent statement may be oral and unsworn and may
be drawn out on cross-examination of the witness himself and, if on
cross-examination the witness denies, or fails to remember, making
such a statement, the fact that the statement was made may be
201. Id. at 1382.
202. Id. at 1383.
203. Id.
204. 472 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1986] 1077
57
Dobson and Braccialarghe: Survey: Evidence
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
proved by another witness. 20 5
The appellate court would have permitted the introduction of extrinsic
evidence in the instant case even though the oral statement had been
made to defendant's attorney and defendant's attorney would have had
to become a witness in the case.206
After reading the quoted passage from Williams above, it comes
as no surprise that the Second District Court of Appeal's sister court in
Courtney v. State,20 7 reversed a conviction because of the trial court's
failure to permit extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of
a state's eyewitness. Courtney was an appeal of a murder conviction
and during the cross-examination by defendant of the state's only eye-
witness, the state's witness denied having told another person that the
state's witness had not seen the crime. The defense attorney sought to
lay the predicate for impeaching the state's witness but the prosecutor's
objection was sustained by the trial court. The defense attorney then
made a proffer of the testimony of three impeachment witnesses. The
proffer of the testimony of one of them, Adams, was that the state's
eyewitness had told Adams that the state's witness had seen nothing.208
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision to exclude extrinsic evidence by another impeachment witness
since the state's eyewitness had admitted having made that statement.
In Toranco v. State200 the court permitted the state to use a prior
inconsistent statement that had not been given to the defense during
discovery because that statement had been in a police report that was
furnished to the defendant. Delgado-Santos v. State21 reversed a first-
degree murder and armed robbery conviction because a prior inconsis-
tent statement, of an alleged accomplice, of the defendant made during
police interrogation was admitted as substantive evidence. The court
held that a police interrogation was not a "proceeding" under section
90.801(a) of the Florida Statutes, even though defendant had been
under oath and had been given his Miranda rights at the time he made
the statement.2 11 In reaching its decision, the appellate court looked to
205. Id. at 1352 (citing United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976) and
FLA. STAT. § 90.614(23) (1983)).
206. Id. at 1352-53.
207. 476 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
208. Id. at 302.
209. 471 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
210. 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
211. Id. at 75-77.
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interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), including
the Congressional history reprinted in the U.S.C.A. found in the com-
ments after each section of the Evidence Code.21 2
Lastly, in affirming a conviction for first-degree murder and vacat-
ing a stay of execution, the Florida Supreme Court in Demps v.
State213 reaffirmed the general rule that evidence of prior consistent
statements, to bolster a witness' testimony, is inadmissible unless there
has been an attempt to attack that witness' credibility.214 Demps in-
volved a post-conviction hearing on the defendant's claim that the state
had interfered with a defense witness. Since the prosecutor declined to
cross-examine one of the defense witnesses at that hearing, the trial
court correctly prohibited the defense from calling other witnesses to
bolster his testimony.
VIII. Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause was invoked in 1985 as the grounds for
appeal in six Florida cases and one federal case which this survey will
discuss. In the federal case, Harris v. Wainwright,15 the Court of Ap-
peal for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the granting of habeas relief by a
district court to a defendant who had been convicted on hearsay evi-
dence. Harris had been convicted of attempted first-degree murder and
attempted robbery. The state contended that after demanding money
from and shooting the victim, Harris fled the scene of the crime in a
yellow Cadillac. The victim's son chased and rammed the Cadillac,
from which three men fled. 1 ' A photograph of Harris was identified by
the victim as that of the robber. At trial, rather than prove ownership
of the yellow Cadillac, the prosecutor asked the police officer if he re-
ceived any information concerning the ownership of the Cadillac and
what did the police officer do after receiving the information, to which
the officer replied that he made a photographic lineup.1 7 Since the sole
purpose of the officer's testimony was to tie the defendant to the rob-
212. In reaching its decision, the Third Distrct Court of Appeal in Delgado es-
chewed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's case by case analysis of Robinson v. State,
455 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) for a "bright line" test. It is difficult to
read Delgado without being persuaded by its reasoning.
213. 462 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1984).
214. Id. at 1075.
215. 760 F.2d 1148 (11th Cir. 1985).
216. Id. at 1149.
217. Id. at 1150.
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bery and attempted murder by means of defendant's connection with
the yellow Cadillac, the court of appeal affirmed the district court's
finding that the error was not harmless.2"8
Another attempted first-degree murder conviction was reversed in
Carrasco v. State.219 Carrasco and Edward Morales were accused of
shooting a man and stealing his car. Carrasco was tried separately
from Morales, but during Carrasco's trial, the police officer who had
taken Morales's confession, told the jury that the confession implicated
Carrasco.220 Finding a violation of Carrasco's sixth amendment right to
confront Morales, the district court of appeal reversed the conviction.221
Restricting a defendant's right to cross-examination resulted in re-
versals in two cases, Rivera v. State222 and Alvarez v. State.22 Rivera
involved an appeal from an aggravated assault conviction. The victims
alleged that while they were driving in a car, someone in Rivera's car
shouted obscenities and pointed a gun.224 While the victims had been
able to note the car's license number, neither one was very sure about
identifying Rivera from a photo lineup until the investigating police
officer pointed out Rivera's picture and said that he was the registered
owner of the car whose license plate they had recorded.225 During the
trial, the prosecutor asked neither the victim nor the police officer
about the photo lineup and the prosecutor successfuly objected to the
defendant's attempt to cross-examine both witnesses about the photo
lineup. This forced the defense to call both witnesses as defense wit-
nesses, thereby prohibiting the defense from impeaching these wit-
nesses by calling another witness to testify that the pointing out of the
defendant's photograph was not standard police procedure.226
Alvarez involved an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction
by a defendant whose conviction rested entirely on the testimony of two
witnesses, an accomplice and an accessory after the fact. The district
court of appeal reversed Alvarez's conviction because the trial court
218. Id. at 1153. Florida's Court of Appeal for the Third District had found in
Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) that the error was
harmless.
219. 470 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
220. Id. at 860-61.
221. Id. at 861.
222. 462 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
223. 467 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
224. 462 So. 2d at 541.
225. Id. at 541-42.
226. Id. at 542.
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had refused to permit Alvarez on cross-examination of the accomplice
to bring out that the accomplice "had served less than eight months of
a thirty-two month sentence by virtue of an agreement with the state to
recommend an-'early parole' in return for 'telling the truth.' ",227 The
district court of appeal also ruled that the defendant should have been
able to cross-examine the accomplice, and accessory after the fact,
about their past convictions, even though those convictions had oc-
curred in Cuba and the defense attorney had no record of the convic-
tion and hence lacked the evidence necessary for impeachment. The
district court of appeal so ruled, even though the defense attorney had
no knowledge of the witnesses' prior convictions.228
On the other hand, a defendant's right to cross-examination was
held not to have been violated when his cross-examination of the main
state witness was limited in Mills v. State.2 9 Mills involved an appeal
from a first-degree murder conviction that arose out of a burglary of a
residence. Mills and an accomplice, Ashley, had entered the victim's
house at night and Mills had shot the victim with a shotgun. Mills'
attorney, the public defender, had previously represented Ashley at the
beginning of the case and in other unrelated charges. The public de-
fender withdrew from representation of Ashley once he became aware
that Ashley was involved in the burglary and murder. The trial court
restricted Mills' cross-examination of Ashley by not permitting Mills to
ask about statements Ashley had made to a public defender investiga-
tor and not permitting the use of those statements to impeach Ashley.
In finding that the attorney/client privilege claimed by Ashley was cor-
rectly used to bar the attempted impeachment, 230 Florida's Supreme
Court noted that Mills had been permitted to impeach Ashley with
several prior inconsistent statements and with Ashley's bargaining for
immunity in return for his testimony.3 Consequently, the supreme
court found no abridgement of Mills' right to confront his accuser.
A defendant's right to confront his accusers requires a reversal
where in an attempt to perpetuate a witness's testimony by taking a
pretrial deposition, the prosecution fails to notify the defendant and
produce the defendant at the deposition. In Brown v. State2 32 the Flor-
227. 467 So. 2d at 455-56.
228. Id. at 456.
229. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985).
230. Id. at 175-76.
231. Id. at 176.
232. 471 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1985).
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ida Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for first-degree
felony murder because the state, while notifying the defense counsel of
its intention to take a deposition and perpetuate testimony of a witness,
failed to notify the defendant and also failed to produce the defendant,
who was in custody at the time, at the deposition. Brown's conviction
was reversed even though his lawyer failed to object at the trial to the
introduction of the deposition and only raised the lack of notice to the
defendant and defendant's absence from the deposition for the first
time on appeal.2 33
Important as the right to confront one's witnesses is, that right can
be waived, as was found by the defendant in Lara v. State.234 Lara
involved an appeal from a conviction of attempted robbery and second-
degree murder. The trial had been a non-jury trial and the defendant
agreed to stipulate that the testimony at the trial would be based on
the discovery taken by both parties prior to trial, thereby obviating the
necessity of calling witnesses. In affirming the conviction, the district
court of appeal held that there was no necessity for an affirmative
showing that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his
right to confront the witnesses against him.2" 5
IX. Testimony of Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an
opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied
to evidence at trial.236
A. Factual Basis Need Not Be Given
In eliciting an opinion from an expert, a party on direct examina-
tion need not establish the factual basis for that opinion.23 7 In City of
233. Id. at 7.
234. 475 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
235. Id. at 1341.
236. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1985).
237. FLA. STAT. § 90.705 (1985).
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Hialeah v. Weatherford,238 the appellate court affirmed a trial court's
permitting a physician to give his opinion that had paramedics ex-
amined the plaintiff's decedent, they would have found that the dece-
dent was having a heart attack and the decedent would not have died
from a heart attack the next day. The defendant city objected to the
opinion being given and failed to cross-examine the doctor as to the
basis for the opinion. In affirming, the appellate court cited to section
90.705 of the Florida Statutes and held:
[TIhe statute eliminates the requirement formerly placed on the
party calling an expert witness to present underlying data and fac-
tual support for expert testimony. Under current law, the burden of
challenging the sufficiency of the basis for the opinion rests with
the party against whom it is offered. 39
B. May Be Based on Inadmissible Evidence
Also, an expert's opinion may be based on inadmissible hearsay,
and that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be made known to the
jury.240 The appellate court in Bendor v. State overturned a defendant's
attempted murder conviction because the trial court refused to permit
defendant's expert witness, a psychiatrist, from testifying about the re-
sults of a computerized brain scan upon which the expert relied in
reaching his diagnosis that the defendant suffered from organic brain
syndrome. This testimony went to the defendant's defense that he was
incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit the crime
charged. 241 The appellate court relied on section 90.704 of the Florida
Statutes in reaching its result.
C. Reasonable Certainty Not Necessary
It may not even be necessary for a medical expert to give his opin-
ion within the bounds of reasonable certainty either for that opinion to
be admitted or for a jury verdict to be based on that opinion. Brate v.
State24 2 was an appeal of a manslaughter conviction. The victim in
238. 466 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
239. Id. at 1129.
240. Bendor v. State, 472 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 1371.
242. 469 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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Brate had died from abdominal bleeding. While there had been testi-
mony that the defendant had stomped the victim once in the chest or
abdomen, there was also testimony that before he was stomped, the
victim might have hit his chest against the dash board of a speeding
car that he was riding in. The medical examiner testified that the blow
to the victim's chest "would have been consistent with either a stomp
with a cowboy boot or a passenger's thrusting impact with the dash-
board of a vehicle . . . [and] that stomping a passenger who had sus-
tained an abdominal injury in a broadside collision probably would ma-
terially contribute to the cause of death. 2 43 The doctor "conceeded
that he could not state with reasonable medical certainty that a boot
stomp killed the decedent or materially contributed to his death."2 44
The appellate court affirmed the admission of the opinion testimony by
the trial court and the conviction even though the doctor "was unwill-
ing to testify within the bounds of reasonable certainty that such a
stomp actually caused or materially contributed to decedent's
death. 245 Reasoning that expert testimony "generally is deemed advi-
sory in nature and ordinarily not conclusive on the judgment of the
jury, ' 246 the appellate court cited to Baker v.. State,247 for the proposi-
tion that medical testimony advancing a reasonable theory of causation
would be sufficient to uphold the conviction where that testimony is
supplemented by other evidence.248 The supplemental other evidence in
Brate was eye witness testimony that the victim had been stomped once
by the defendant.2 49
In 1985, Florida appellate courts affirmed trial court rulings per-
mitting experts to testify to the identity of a victim through old dental
records, 250 the results of a neutron activation analysis to show a
probability that the defendant fired a gun, even though that test does
243. Id. at 792-93.
244. Id. at 793.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 492 (1892).
248. 469 So. 2d at 794.
249. While the Brate court appears to be correct in not finding a difficulty with
the doctor's inability to give an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
as to cause of death, and in permitting the doctor's testimony that the victim's injuries
were consistent with the boot stomp, on redirect examination, the doctor said his con-
clusion was "within the bounds of reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 793.
250. Stand v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (Fla. 1985).
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not conclusively establish whether a gun has been recently fired, 51 and
the number of assailants as well as their relative strength vis-a-vis the
victim based on strangulation marks.2 52 On the other hand, experts
were not permitted to testify about false confessions,2 53 the defects of a
model of a device other than the device implanted in plaintiff,254 testi-
mony resulting from hypnosis,255 polygraph answers, 56 thermogram re-
sults,257 the cause of brain damage,258 and testimony about the battered
woman syndrome.25 9
3-M Corp. v. Brown260 involved a suit against the manufacturer of
a mammary implant by a plaintiff who was injured as a result of the
implant's rupture. The appellate court found that the trial court erred
in permitting an expert to testify about the design defects of one model
of breast implant without any testimony that that model was similar to
a different model, the one actually implanted in plaintiff's breast.2 61
The appellate court also held that the plaintiff's medical expert "was
erroneously allowed to testify as to the "possibility" of future medical
treatment and complications. 262 This speculative type of testimony is
"not probative of . . .future damages. ' 263
D. Hypnosis
In affirming Theodore Bundy's conviction in Bundy v. State,26 , the
Florida Supreme Court held "that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
per se inadmissible in a criminal trial in this state, but hypnosis does
not render a witness incompentent to testify to those facts demonstra-
251. Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176-7 (Fla. 1985).
252. Endress v. State, 462 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
253. Stand, 473 So. 2d at 1287.
254. 3-M Corp. v. Brown, 475 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
255. Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
256. Carter v. State, 474 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
257. Crawford v. Shivaskankar, 474 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
258. Executive Car and Truck Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So. 2d 1027 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
259. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
260. 475 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
261. Id. at 996.
262. Id. at 998.
263. Id. (citing Crosby v. Flemming and Sons, Inc., 447 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
264. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
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Lively recalled prior to hynopsis." 26 5 However, Bundy's conviction was
affirmed because the Florida Supreme Court found that totally apart
from the hynoptically refreshed testimony, the witness was able to tes-
tify to other facts that he recalled prior to the hynopsis.
288
The appellate court in Carter v. State 67 affirmed a trial court's
denial of the defendant's motion to compel production of a victim's an-
swers to a polygraph which the polygraph examiner felt were untrue.268
The defendant had been given a copy of the victim's statement to the
polygraph examiner, the questions asked and her answers. The appel-
late court found that to compel production of specific answers which
the polygraph examiner found untrue would not have aided the defense
as that information could not have been used in evidence.
Refusal to admit thermograms was upheld in Crawford v.
Shivashankar 9 Crawford claimed to have sustained injury to her
neck as a result of an automobile accident. Although their objective
findings were slight, four doctors testified that Crawford had suffered
some degree of permanent injury.270 The trial court refused to permit
Crawford to introduce thermogram photographs or to have a neurolo-
gist give his opinion that thermographic examination showed soft tissue
injury. Not only had Crawford not listed the "thermograms as proposed
evidence in her pre-trial statement, but she "had failed to show that
thermography was a well-established and reliable technique for de-
tecting soft tissue injury. "271 While the appellate court found that it
was error for the trial court to exclude the neurologist's opinion, the
appellate court found the error to be harmless as four other doctors had
testified that there was injury and that it was permanent, hence making
the neurologist's testimony cumulative. After examining the evidence
that Crawford elicited as to the reliability and acceptability of ther-
mography, the appellate court refused to find an abuse of discretion in
the trial court's exclusion of the thermography evidence based on the
facts of that case.272
It is not necessary for a clinical psychologist to be a medical doc-
tor in order to testify to the existence of organic brain damage. This
265. Id. at 18.
266. Id. at 19.
267. 474 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
268. Id. at 398.
269. 474 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
270. Id. at 874.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 875.
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was the holding of Executive Car and Truck Leasing, Inc. v.
DeSerio.17 Executive Car and Truck involved an appeal from a judg-
ment arising out of an automobile collision. DeSerio's neurosurgeon
testified that he could not detect any permanent organic brain damage
and so he referred DeSerio to a clinical psychologist for psychological
testing, something which he commonly does. The clinical psychologist
testified that he then gave DeSerio psychological tests commonly used
by psychologists to identify organic brain damage, and based on those
tests, it was his opinion that DeSerio had suffered organic brain dam-
age. Because neurosurgeons rely on psychological testing to detect
organic brain damage, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's "al-
lowing a clinical psychologist who is not a medical doctor to testify to
the existence of organic brain damage. 2 7 5 Noting that the Florida Su-
preme Court had previously held that medical testimony is not always
necessary to show causation between an occurrence and damages, 7 6
the appellate court found that allowing the clinical psychologist to tes-
tify that the automobile accident caused the organic brain damage was
harmless error. Consistent with Executive Car is G.LW. Southern
Valve Co. v. Smith,77 which cited Executive Car in support of its rul-
ing that a clinical psychologist who is not a medical doctor could not
testify "that because of the accident, plaintiff's brain would deteriorate
much more rapidly in the future. ... 2
E. Battered Woman Syndrome
Psychiatric testimony about the battered woman syndrome was
addressed in Terry v. State,279 Hawthorne v. State2 80 and Ward v.
State.281 Terry reversed the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
as to the battered woman syndrome. The appellate court found that
specialized knowledge of an expert would aid the jury in understanding
the defense of self defense. The court noted that admission of the bat-
273. 468 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
274. Id. at 1028.
275. Id. at 1029.
276. Id. at 1030 (citing Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609
(Fla. 1958)).
277. 471 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
278. Id. at 82.
279. 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
280. 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
281. 470 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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tered woman syndrome testimony is based on a trial court determina-
tion that the "expert is qualified and the field is sufficiently developed
to support an expert opinion.' ' 8s Hawthorne v. State involved an ap-
peal from a manslaughter conviction.2 83 The appellate court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defend-
ant's proffered expert, Dr. Lorraine Walker, from testifying that the
defendant was a battered woman. The trial court held three days of
hearings and decided it "is not convinced that she has knowledge neces-
sary to give such testimony . . . [and that the] depth of study in this
field had not yet reached the point where an expert witness can give
testimony with any degree of assurance that the state of the art will
support an expert opinion . ,,.s8 Hawthorne was reversed for other
reasons and the majority invited the defendant to again attempt to
qualify an expert in the battered woman syndrome. In a lengthy dissent
as to that part of the case, Judge Ervin argued for overturning the trial
court's refusal to permit Dr. Walker to testify as an expert. In af-
firming a second degree murder conviction, the appellate court in Ward
v. State 85 found that the defendant had not made a sufficient record
for appeal to permit the appellate court to review the question of ad-
missibility of the battered wife syndrome.2 86 After the first of two pro-
posed defense witnesses had been excluded, the defendant then decided
without any court ruling to not call the second witness who would have
testified to the battered wife syndrome. By failing to give the trial court
an opportunity to evaluate the qualifications of the second witness and
the syndrome, the defendant had precluded any possible action by the
appellate court.2 87
Finding that an expert opinion must be relevant to be admissible,
it must prove or tend to prove a fact in issue, the Florida Supreme
Court in Stano v. Florida288 affirmed a trial court's refusal to permit a
psychiatrist to testify that certain people confessed to crimes which
they did not commit, finding the proffered testimony to be irrelevant.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled this way even though the defendant
was also prepared to put on testimony of a police officer to whom the
282. 467 So. 2d at 765.
283. The defendant's previous conviction of first-degree murder had been re-
versed, as was her subsequent second-degree murder conviction.
284. Id. at 773.
285. 470 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
286. Id. at 101.
287. Id.
288. 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).
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defendant had confessed a murder which the defendant had not com-
mitted and even though the defendant's theory of defense was that the
defendant had killed someone other than the victim.289 What the su-
preme court found lacking was a proffer that the defendant's confession
in the instant case "was infirm or tainted. 290
X. Hearsay
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. 291
Out of court statements can be introduced for their truth under
one of the many exceptions to the general proscription of hearsay.
A. Admissions
Admissions, statements of one party offered against that party, are
one of the easiest exceptions to meet. In two of the six cases that fall
under direct admissions, S. C. v. State"2 and Adams v. School Board
of Brevard County,293 the admissions addressed were those of the par-
ties themselves. The case of S. C. involved an appeal from a circuit
court order adjudicating a child as dependent and placing the child in
foster care. Two other children had previously been taken away from
the parents of S. C. and the evidence issues involved the admissibility
of (1) the hearsay testimony of a woman to what S. C.'s father had
told her as the reason the two other children had been removed (a six-
year old girl suffering from venereal disease and a five-year old boy
from neglect) and (2) the father's testimony as the state's adverse wit-
ness as to the reason that the other two children had been taken away
from their parents. The district court of appeal found that the woman's
testimony, while hearsay, was an exception as an admission by the fa-
ther, whom the appellate court declared to be a party. 94 The father's
statements as an adverse witness were found not to be hearsay (why he
289. Id. at 1285-86.
290. Id. at 1286.
291. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1985).
292. 471 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
293. 470 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
294. 471 So. 2d at 1328.
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was told the other children had been taken away) but rather informa-
tion based on his own personal knowledge.295
Adams involved the appeal by several students of their expulsion
from high school for using, possessing or selling controlled substances
or substances that are held out to be controlled substances. While hear-
say is admissible at administrative hearings, there must also be other
competent evidence. 29 6 Consequently, those students who made state-
ments to administrative deans had their expulsions affirmed, as those
statements were deemed to be admissions. 297
One can remain silent and by his silence be deemed to have
adopted the out-of-court statement of another, which out-of-court
statement is then admissible as an adoptive admission. Drake v.
State29 8 was an appeal from a conviction of attempted second-degree
murder, aggravated battery and armed robbery with a deadly weapon.
Drake was accused of stealing money from a church where his wife
worked and of hitting his wife on the head with a hammer. Even
though his wife had no memory of the incident, a police officer was
permitted to testify that while she was in the wife's hospital room, she
heard the wife say to the defendant, "You don't care for me at all. '2 99
The defendant said that he did care, to which his wife responded,
"Well, you certainly don't act like it." When the husband asked why
the wife said that, she replied "How would you like me to hit you on
your habit?"300 The police officer then testified that the defendant said
nothing and then left the hospital room. The police officer followed the
defendant into the hall and he looked back at her twice.301 The appel-
295. Id. A witness who testifies to what he has actually perceived is said to have
personal knowledge under § 90.604 of the Florida Statutes. While this may seem a
strange response to hearsay, examples include: one's name (perhaps hearsay if based on
what one's parents said but personal knowledge if based of one's observations of how
one is addressed by parents and others); one's physical condition (again, perhaps hear-
say if told by a doctor but personal knowledge if based on one's perception of pain
inside and maybe a protruding bone); etc.
In the instant case, the appellate court found that the father's statements were
"not a repetition of statements made to him by Connecticut authorities but [were] of
his personal knowledge of the reasons for the children's commitment." Id.
296. 470 So. 2d at 762. See also infra notes 335-46 which address the use of
hearsay at dependency, probation and forfeiture proceedings.
297. 470 So. 2d 762-63.
298. 476 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
299. Id. at 211.
300. Id. at 212.
301. Id.
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late court affirmed the admission of the wife's comment to her husband
and his silent response as an admission by silence.30 2 In the event that
the victim's words were not an accusation but were meaningless, the
appellate court conceded that the police officer's testimony would be
irrelevant and claimed that in that circumstance would also be
harmless. 303
Another example of a statement that would be admitted against a
party as an admission is a statement made by a servant or an employee
about a matter within the scope of the employment.304 Poitier v.
School Board of Broward County30 5 involved an appeal by a plaintiff
who failed to recover for injuries to her daughter when her daughter
slipped and fell on a wet floor in a school cafeteria. The appellate court
reversed the case based on the trial court's erroneous exclusion of the
mother's conversation with a school employee, a janitor, after the acci-
dent. The mother proffered that the janitor said that the janitors knew
they were supposed to put up ropes and signs when they cleaned an
area, but that they generally did not do so.308 The appellate court
found that the janitor's statement to the mother was an admission and
should have been introduced as an exception to hearsay since the
janitor was an employee of the school board and the janitor's statement
was about a matter within the scope of his duties.30 7
Statements of a co-conspirator can also be introduced against one
as one's own statements, and hence exceptions to hearsay. An example
is found in State v. Wilson,3"8 a petition for a writ of certiorari by the
state of a judge's denial of a pretrial motion to permit the state to use
statements of co-conspirators against the defendants. However, to pre-
serve for appeal a trial court's erroneous exclusion of testimony that
would fit under an admissions exception to the hearsay rule, one must
302. Id. at 215.
303. Id.
304. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(d) (1985).
305. 475 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
306. Id. at 1275.
307. Id. While the appellate court reached the correct evidentiary result, its lan-
guage was rather sloppy, specifically in referring to the janitor's statement as "an ad-
mission against the interests of his employer." Id. The court seems to confuse "admis-
sions" (§ 90.803(18)) with "declarations against interest" (FLA. STAT. § 90.804). The
reason for this becomes apparent when one notes that the appellate court cited not to
the Florida Evidence Code but to case law. The Sponsors' Note to § 90.803(18) men-
tions that some courts tend to make this confusion.
308. 466 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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assert the ground for admissibility at trial.309
B. Spontaneous Statements and Excited Utterances
Statements made describing or explaining an event or condition
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immedi-
ately thereafter, as well as statements relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement
caused by the event or condition may be admitted in court as the ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule known as spontaneous statements and ex-
cited utterances. 310
The circumstantial guarantee of [a spontaneous statement] is that
when a spontaneous statement of narration is made simultaneously
with perception, the substantial contemporaneity of event and
statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misin-
terpretation. The theory of [an excited utterance] is simply that
when an excited utterance is made, the circumstances produce a
condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of re-
flection and produces utterance free of conscious fabrication. The
key element in both is spontaneity.311
An example of each is found in Preston v. State.3 12 Preston was an
appeal from a conviction of sexual battery. After having dinner and
drinks with her boyfriend, the victim went to a bar close to where her
boyfriend worked to wait for him. While waiting for her boyfriend, the
victim met and drank with the defendant. When her boyfriend didn't
come back for her, the victim left with the defendant who had offered
to take her to her home, stopping at the Elks Club where they had
more drinks. After the club closed, the defendant and the victim left
and the victim claimed that the defendant forced her to perform oral
sex on him in his van. When the van stopped at a traffic signal, the
victim ran to the nearest house and reported the incident.3 13 At trial, a
fourteen-year old boy testified to what the victim told him about the
incident without objection from the defense. The appellate court stated
309. Rezzarday v. West Fla. Hosp., 462 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
310. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(1) and (2), respectively.
311. Sponsors' Note to FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(l) and (2).
312. 470 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
313. Id. at 836-37.
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that the victim's statements to the boy were admissible either as a
spontaneous statement or an excited utterance."1 4 However the defense
unsuccessfully objected to testimony by the victim's boyfriend and a
police officer as to what the victim told them about the incident. Be-
cause between one and two hours had elapsed since the incident and
the telling of the story, because the victim had left the bar with the
defendant "for several hours of drinking and 'partying', as described by
several witnesses, she had a possible reason to contrive a story or mis-
represent to her boyfriend," and because the victim appeared to be ner-
vous and upset, the appellate court reversed the conviction finding that
the statements were inadmissible hearsay as there had been time for
reflection and a motive to fabricate by the victim.3 15 The appellate
court was clear to point out that the statements were excluded because
of all of the factors of the case, taken together, rather than any single
factor.316
C. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Conditions
An out-of-court statement may be an exception to the hearsay rule
if the statement regards the declarant's existing state of mind, emotion
or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, de-
sign, mental feeling which is offered to prove the declarant's state of
mind. 1 An example is found in Peede v. State,318 an appeal from a
murder conviction. Before going to meet the defendant, the victim told
her daughter that she was going to the airport to pick up the defend-
ant, and "that she was nervous and scared that she might be in danger,
that her daughter should call the police if she was not back by mid-
night, that she was afraid of being with the other people he had
314. Id. at 837.
315. Id.
316. The appellate court also found that the statements were not admissible as
prior consistent statements under § 90.801 (2)(b), as they were made after the existence
of a motive to fabricate.
In another case, Cox v. State, 473 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
statements made by a defendant's wife on learning that her husband had been in an
accident were admissible as excited utterances. The statements were made immediately
upon being notified of her husband's accident, "an occurrence startling enough to pro-
duce nervous excitement and render the utterances spontaneous and unreflecting." 473
So. 2d at 782 (cite omitted). As the statements were not given, nothing further can be
gleaned from Cox.
317. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3) (1985).
318. 474 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
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threatened to kill, and that he would kill them all on Easter." '319 The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's having permitted the
daughter to testify to what the victim had told the daughter. In Peede,
the Florida Supreme Court found that the victim's mental state was at
issue regarding elements of the kidnapping which formed the basis of
the state's felony-murder theory, i.e. it was necessary for the state to
prove forcible abduction of the victim against her will. It is not appar-
ent why the Peede court felt it had to address the issue since it points
out that the testimony came in at trial without any hearsay
objection.320
D. Business Records
Records that are kept in the ordinary course of a business may be
admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.32 1 However, the supplier of
the information in the business record must have a business duty to
supply the information, i.e. he must work for the business whose
records are sought to be introduced. 22 Computer printouts can be busi-
ness records, but before someone can testify to what was on a computer
printout, the foundation must be laid to admit the computer printout as
a business record.3 23
Where the business record is prepared solely in anticipation of liti-
gation, it lacks trustworthiness and may not be admitted as a business
record. 24 Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp. in-
volved an appeal from a suit against a restaurant by a customer who
slipped and fell. The manager of the restaurant immediately filled out
319. Id. at 816.
320. Id.
321. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1985).
322. See Eicholz v. Pepo Petroleum Co., 475 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
323. Cofield v. State, 474 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Cofield
involved an appeal from a grand theft conviction. The appellate court held that the
state failed to adequately prove the value of the stolen equipment. The state witness
had no personal knowledge as to the value but used a computer printout prepared by
someone else that listed the cost of'each item stolen.
It is difficult to tell from the decision, but it doesn't appear that the state tried to
offer the computer print-out as evidence. Since the computer print-out was not offered
as a business record, it remained hearsay and the state witness could not use that rec-
ord to testify to the value of the goods stolen. Id.
324. See Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp., 465 So. 2d
1296 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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an accident report stating that nothing was on the floor and forwarded
that report to the restaurant's insurance carrier in anticipation of litiga-
tion.325 The appellate court found the accident report to be inadmissible
as business record because of its lack of trustworthiness: the report was
made solely to help defend against an anticipated claim; the manager
had a business motive to fabricate and no business motive to be truth-
ful; accident reports have generally been considered "work product"
and therefore not discoverable because they are prepared solely for liti-
gation and have no business purpose. 26
E. Absence of Public Record or Entry
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the certification that a
diligent search failed to disclose a public record, when offered to prove
absence of the record that would have been made and preserved by a
public office or agency.3 27 An example of an absence of a public record
is found in Terranova v. State.3 28 Terranova was convicted of engaging
in the business of a contractor without being duly registered or certi-
fied. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's having admitted into
evidence a certificate of nonlicensure by the Construction Industry Li-
censing Board. 29
F. Unavailable Declarant
There are some circumstances where the unavailability of a de-
clarant will permit his declaration to be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule. The test is two-pronged: the declarant must be unavaila-
ble - able to assert a privilege, refuses to testify, has suffered lack of
memory, illness or death prevents his attendance or the proponent can-
not procure his appearance - and the statement must be one of the
several recognized exceptions - former testimony subject to cross-ex-
amination, dying declaration, statement against interest or a statement
of personal or family history.330 Stano v. State33' involved an appeal
from a conviction of first-degree murder. The defendant's first trial had
325. Id. at 1297.
326. Id. at 1298.
327. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(10) (1985).
328. 474 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
329. Id. at 1208-9.
330. FLA. STAT. § 90.804 (1985).
331. 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).
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ended in a mistrial and the victim's parents refused to testify during
the second trial and were therefore unavailable under section
90.804(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes. Consequently, the court permit-
ted the state to read in the victim's parents' former testimony under
section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Since the parents had said sanc-
tions would not induce them to testify and the defendant had the op-
portunity for a full cross-examination of the parents in the prior trial,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Florida Su-
preme Court affirmed another first-degree murder conviction in Brown
v. State.3 3 2 Brown and two accomplices burglarized the home of an
eighty-one year old woman who was also raped and killed. One of
Brown's co-defendants testified against him and also stated that the
third man, Rickey, was the defendant's stepson. This testimony was
found to be an exception to hearsay as the stepson was unavailable at
the time of the trial (the police were still looking for him) and the
statement of the relationship was permitted by the second prong, a
statement of personal or family history, under section 90.804(2)(d) of
the Florida Statutes.3 1 Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens334 in-
volved an asbestos products liability action in which the plaintiff sought
to introduce depositions of two witnesses taken in other actions. Since
the defendant or its predecessor in interest had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses during their depositions in the prior actions and
since the witnesses had both since died, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's permitting the plaintiff to read into evidence the deposi-
tions from the other lawsuits.3 5
G. Dependency, Probation and Forfeiture Proceedings
Lawyers must be attentive to hearsay problems in dependency pro-
ceedings, probation revocation hearings and forfeiture proceedings as
well as at trials. In reversing an order declaring children to be depen-
dent and placing the children in the custody of the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, the appellate court in In re S.J.T.
and T.N.T.336 held that admission of numerous exhibits including case
summaries and observations of field workers and doctors who had vis-
332. 473 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1985).
333. Id. at 1264.
334. 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
335. Id. at 259-62.
336. 475 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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ited the family and observed the treatment of the children, the trial
court had erroneously admitted hearsay evidence. The appellate court
noted that in conducting adjudicatory hearings in dependency actions,
a judge is required to apply "the rules of evidence in use in civil
cases ... ."3
While hearsay evidence is admissible in a probation revocation
proceeding, 338 a probation revocation may not be premised solely on the
basis of hearsay evidence.339 Bass v. State3 40 involved an appeal from a
trial court's order revoking probation for failure to work diligently,
make restitution and pay a fine.341 Because Bass had admitted the vio-
lations, the appellate court found that the probation had not been re-
voked solely on hearsay evidence, but also on non-hearsay admis-
sions.342 Davis v. State343 also involved an appeal from a revocation of
probation. The appellate court ordered excised from the written order
of revocation the probationer's failure to pay the cost of supervision, as
the only evidence of that had been hearsay.3 " In reversing a trial
court's order forfeiting an automobile used in the commission of a
337. Id. at 953 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(b)). The appellate court notes
that some of the evidence could have been introduced as a business records exception if
the proper foundation had been laid.
Another dependency case, In re A.D.J. and D.L.J., 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985), found no reversable error in admitting hearsay statements and reports
as: "The record reflects that the trial judge was aware of appellant's several hearsay
objections and gave no probative effect to the inadmissible hearsay." Id. at 1162.
In Re A.D.J. and D.L.J. is a frustrating opinion to read because of its lack of
detail about the statements themselves and how the appellate court knew the trial
judge did not consider the statements. It was reversed for other reasons.
338. Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1982).
339. Turner v. State, 293 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) and Curry v.
State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
340. 473 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
341. Id. at 1368.
342. Id. at 1369 (The order revoking Bass's probation was reversed, however,
because the trial court failed to make a factual determination that Bass had an ability
to make restitution and pay the fine).
343. 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
344. Id. at 1246. The appellate court affirmed the violation as to the proba-
tioner's failure to file written reports but remanded to permit the trial court to recon-
sider whether the probation should be revoked solely for failure to file written reports.
Both the opinion of the appellate court and the concurring opinion specifically men-
tioned that the trial court was free to reach the same conclusion as before and revoke
the probation solely for the failure to file the required reports. Id. at 1247.
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crime, the appellate court in Doersam v. Brescher 45 held that "hearsay
evidence should not be admitted in a final hearing in forfeiture pro-
ceedings and, of course, such evidence may not form the basis for a
factfinder's decision that the property was utilized in the commission of
a crime. '3 46 In arriving at its decision, the Doersam court noted that
even in administrative hearings, hearsay evidence was not sufficient but
could only be used to supplement or explain other evidence.34 7
H. Prior Inconsistent & Consistent Statements
Out-of-court statements may be introduced for reasons other than
their truth, in which case they are not subject to the prohibition against
hearsay. One example is a trial Witness' prior consistent statement
which is offered to rebut a charge of improper influence, motive, or
recent fabrication.348 Parker v. State" 9 was an appeal from a convic-
tion of first-degree murder. Parker and two co-defendants had been
charged with robbing a convenience store and killing the convenience
store's clerk. The girlfriend of one of the co-defendants had spoken to
Parker when Parker was in jail and in answer to the girlfriend's ques-
tion of who had shot the convenience store clerk, Parker stated that he
had shot the clerk. The co-defendant's girlfriend then told her mother
and sister what Parker had told her. At the trial, not only was the
prosecutor permitted to introduce the testimony of the co-defendant's
girlfriend, but was also permitted to call the girlfriend's mother and
sister to show that the girlfriend's story was not a recent fabrication.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with Parker that permitting the
girlfriend's sister and mother to testify was error because the girl-
friend's motive to testify (to keep her boyfriend out of the electric
chair) existed at the time the co-defendant's girlfriend had made the
statements to her mother and sister.38 0 However, the Florida Supreme
Court found that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction.
Another example of an out-of-court statement, that is not coming
in for its truth, is a prior inconsistent statement3 50°1 Busch v. State35'
345. 468 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
346. Id. at 428.
347. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1985)).
348. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1985).
349. 476 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1985).
350. Id. at 137.
350.1 FLA. STAT. § 90.614.
351. 466 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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was an appeal from a conviction of attempted first-degree murder and
shooting into an occupied building. Busch admitted the shooting but
claimed that the weapon had accidentally discharged while he was in
his truck outside the building. A key state witness was Busch's female
companion of the evening who at trial testified that the firing of the
weapon had been intentional. When originally questioned about the in-
cident, Busch's female companion has stated that the weapon dis-
charged accidentally. At the trial the prosecutor brought out both the
prior inconsistent statement and the motivation for that statement, that
the witness was afraid of Busch.3 52 While the appellate court does not
appear to be sure whether the complained-of testimony was hearsay$5 3
or whether it was error to permit the testimony,35 4 the appellate court
decided that if the testimony were error, it was harmless. 355
Under certain circumstances, prior inconsistent statements are not
merely admissible, but may actually be accepted as substantive evi-
dence. 356 However, as the case of Moore v. State357 indicates, even as
substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent statement may not be suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction in the absence of competent corroborating
evidence. Moore involved an appeal from a conviction of second-degree
murder. Moore had been indicted by a Grand Jury for first-degree
murder based on the testimony of two witnesses who had identified
Moore as the murderer. Both witnesses later recanted their statements
352. Id. at 1077, 1079.
353. "While the testimony introduced was allegedly hearsay ... " Id. at 1079.
354. "While it may have been error to permit the allegedly hearsay testi-
mony. . . ." Id.
355. Id. From the opinion, it is not clear if the panel was bothered by what they
perceived as an attack on the defendant's character or by the witness' reason or basis
for her fear. The opinion does not contain the testimony to which the defendant ob-
jected. Even assuming that the witness had said she was afraid of the defendant be-
cause she had been told he was dangerous, that testimony would not be objectionable
as hearsay because it would not be coming in for its truth, but rather to show the
witness' basis for her fear. The distinction may be a fine one, but it is the job of appel-
late courts, no less than trial courts and evidence teachers, to make these distinctioins
until Florida chooses to permit hearsay evidence in its courts.
356. § 90.801(2)(a) states that:
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is:
(a) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition. ..
357. 473 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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in depositions and Moore had successfully moved to dismiss the indict-
ments. An appellate court reinstated the indictment,358 a decision the
Florida Supreme Court approved3 59 holding that:
[U]nder section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), the prior
inconsistent statement of a witness at a criminal trial, if given
under oath before a Grand Jury, is excluded from the definition of
hearsay and may be admitted into evidence not only for impeach-
ment purposes but also as substantive evidence on material issues
of fact.360
Before Moore was tried, both witnesses who had accused him
before the Grand Jury pled guilty to perjury. At trial, the witnesses
testified that their Grand Jury testimony had been false and that their
deposition testimony had been true. Nevertheless, the jury convicted
Moore of second-degree murder. The appellate court reversed the con-
viction, holding that: "[P]rior inconsistent statements standing alone do
not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 361
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court distinguished Webb
v. State36 2 because "in Webb the State had introduced other cor-
roborating evidence in addition to the witness's recanted testimony." 363
XI. Photographs and Demonstrative Evidence
Seven of the eight cases dealing with photos or demonstrative evi-
dence that this survey will examine are criminal cases. The state's in-
troduction of photographs was either proper or, if erroneous, harmless
in six of those cases and the trial court's refusal to let the defendant
introduce photos and demonstrative evidence in the seventh case was
affirmed.
If a defendant is going to contend that the improper admission of
photographs contributed to his conviction, he must do so on direct ap-
peal and not in a motion for post-conviction relief.364 The "admission of
photographic evidence is within the trial court's discretion and ...a
358. State v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
359. Moore v. State, 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984).
360. Id. at 562.
361. 473 So. 2d at 688.
362. 426 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
363. 473 So. 2d at 687.
364. Gentry v. State, 464 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing
of clear abuse." 365 Even gruesome or inflammatory photographs maybe
admitted if they are relevant.366 Mills v. State3 67 involves an appeal
from a conviction of first degree murder. The state's main witness was
a co-defendant who claimed that Mills hit the victim on the back of the
head with a tire iron and then shot the victim with a shot gun.368 Mills
contended that it was error for the trial court to admit a photograph of
the victim's skull because the photograph was irrelevant to any dis-
puted issue, cumulative and prejudiced the jury. In affirming the con-
viction, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's con-
tentions, and found the photograph relevant because it "helped
establish how long the victim had been dead . . . [and] explain the
lack of medical evidence that the victim had received a blow to the
skull by Mills, as [the co-defendant] had testified.3 69
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed three first degree
murder convictions and the trial court's admission of photographs that
the defendant contended were gruesome in Henderson v. State.37 0 Hen-
derson had been accused of binding, gagging, and killing three
hitchhikers. The Florida Supreme Court seemed peaked that the de-
fendant would challenge the introduction of the photographs,37 1 and
stated that the photographs of the victims' partially decomposed bodies
"were relevant to show the location of the victims' bodies, the amount
of time that had passed from when the victims were murdered to when
their bodies were found, and the manner in which they were clothed,
bound and gagged.372
Even where irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial photographs are er-
roneously admitted, if the error is harmless, a conviction will be af-
firmed. Little v. State,373 involved an appeal by two defendants of their
365. Duest v. State, 462 So. 2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1985).
366. Adams v. State, 412 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022
(1981), cited in Mills v. State, 462 So. 2d 1075, 1080 (Fla. 1985) and Henderson v.
State, 463 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 1985).
367. 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1985).
368. Id. at 1078.
369. Id. at 1080.
370. 463 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1985).
371. "Those whose work products are murdered human beings should expect to
be confronted by photographs of their accomplishments." Id. at 200.
372. Id.
373. 474 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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convictions for armed robbery. Based on a tip from a confidential in-
formant, the police went to an apartment expecting to find Little.
While in the apartment, they arrested Little's co-defendant and while
searching the apartment for Little they found photographs of Little and
his co-defendant posing with their guns pointed at the photographer, as
well .as a photograph of a bag with a gun protruding from it.174 The
appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding admission of the photo-
graphs harmless error even though none of the guns seen in the photo-
graphs were positively identified as those used in the robbery and, be-
cause the poses would suggest to the jury that the defendants were of
poor character, the photographs were thus unfairly prejudicial. 75 In
the words of the appellate court:
The trial judge erroneously admitted into evidence the photographs
seized during the search over the objections of the defendants. As
to their relevancy, there is no evidence as to where or when the
photographs were taken. They do not depict a prior similar act of
robbery. The record does not reveal that the association of appel-
lants was at issue and the photos were therefore not properly ad-
mitted as probative of that issue. Nor were any of the four guns
seen in the photographs positively identified as those used in the
robbery. Moreover, the prosecution had placed two guns into evi-
dence which it alleged were those used in the robbery. We also find
that the photographs were likely to be unfairly prejudicial to the
appellants because the poses would suggest to the jury that appel-
lants were of poor character. We conclude that the photos were
irrelevant, not material to any issue in controversy, and had a ten-
dency to be inflammatory and potentially confusing to the jury.
Notwithstanding the error committed in the admission of the
photographs, the convictions are affirmed, as we find that the error
was harmless.37 6
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to prohibit counsel
from showing demonstrative exhibits to the jury during closing argu-
ments if those exhibits were not introduced into evidence during the
trial.377 Walker v. State involved an appeal of a conviction of at-
tempted second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault.
During his cross examination of state witnesses, defense counsel had
374. Id. at 331.
375. Id. at 332.
376. Id.
377. Walker v. State, 473 So. 2d 694, 696 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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used a drawing, but he had not put that drawing in evidence in order to
"sandwich" the prosecution's closing argument. During the defense
closing, the prosecutor successfully objected to the defense counsel's use
of the drawing in argument to the jury. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court, finding no abuse of discretion in prohibiting defense
counsel from showing exhibits to the jury since those exhibits had not
been introduced into evidence .37
Relevant evidence may be inadmissible if its probative value is
substantially out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.37 9 In State v. Wright,380 the appellate court affirmed a trial
court's excluding defense evidence, including photographs and demon-
strative evidence, which "was of dubious probative value . . . .[and
whose] potential for confusion of issues and misleading the jury was
substantial."3 " Wright involved a defendant convicted of raping a four-
teen-year-old girl. The defense was that the defendant's penis was so
large as to make the rape unlikely if not impossible. The victim had
testified that she had been raped twice, each time over a twenty minute
period and that "the rapist moved rapidly up and down. .. "2 On
cross examination of the examining physician, the defendant brought
out that violent thrusting by a nine inch penis would be likely to cause
vaginal lacerations, which were not found in the victim. However, the
physician would not equate violent thrusting with rapid thrusting. The
defendant's girlfriend and wife both testified that intercourse with the
defendant was very painful and had been accompanied by bleeding.
Two other individuals were permitted to testify that the defendant's
penis was eight and one half inches long. However, the trial court re-
fused to permit one of the witnesses to testify that the circumference of
the defendant's penis was five and one half inches and refused to per-
mit the defendant to introduce photographs, a wooden model and to
display his penis to the jury.383 The appellate court affirmed the convic-
tion finding that "[tihe potential for confusion of issues and misleading
378. Id. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's having permitted the
prosecutor to introduce photos of the defendant. The photos had been taped so that
numbers and dates were not visible, thereby permitting no inference that the defendant
had been arrested before. Id. at 698.
379. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1985).
380. 473 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
381. Id. at 270.
382. Id. at 269.
383. Id.
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the jury was substantial." 384
XII. Best Evidence
Except as otherwise provided by statute, an original writing, re-
cording, or photograph is required in order to prove the contents of
the writing, recording, or photograph.3 85
While the Florida Evidence Code has a Best Evidence Rule, one
requiring introduction of an original document under certain circum-
stances, the Florida Evidence Code liberally permits the admissibility
of duplicates8 6, which includes photocopies as well as carbon copies. 387
Two cases involving reversals of trial courts for failure to admit dupli-
cates were Gastroenterology Associates v. Matuson3 88 and Tillman v.
Smith.38 9 Gastroenterology Associates involved an appeal from an un-
successful suit by doctors against a patient who had not paid them. The
trial court refused to permit one of the doctors to prove the services
rendered either by oral testimony or by business records, reasoning that
the Best Evidence Rule required that original hospital records were the
only evidence that would be permitted. 390 In reversing the trial court,
the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, ruled that since the
doctors' records contained photocopies of the originals, the records
should have been received as duplicates under section 90.953 of the
Florida Evidence Code.391 Moreover, the appellate court pointed out
that the doctor's records were his business records and would have been
admissible on that score alone, and the doctor's oral testimony should
384. Id. at 270. The opinion does not state whether the defense also included
identity. If it did, then the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence and the appellate
court's affirmance would appear to be erroneous.
If, on the other hand, the defense was not misidentification, but only that no pene-
tration or intercourse occurred, then the ruling is correct as the examining physician
found sperm in the victim's vagina, as well as engorged blood vessels - hence the
proffered evidence would be of questionable probative value and would likely lead to
confusion of the issues.
385. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (1985).
386. FLA. STAT. § 90.953 (1985).
387. FLA. STAT. § 90.951 (4)(1985).
388. 9 Fla. Supp. 2d 94 (1 1th Cir. Ct. 1985).
389. 472 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
390. 9 Fla. Supp. 2d at 95.
391. Id. at 95-96.
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also have been be admissible.392 In Tillman, the trial court had refused
to accept into evidence a duplicate copy of an antenuptial agreement
under the theory that the antenuptial agreement was a document in-
volving the payment of money, and hence inadmissible under section
90.953 (1) of the Florida Statutes. In rejecting the trial court's ruling
excluding the antenuptial agreement, the appellate court's language
seems to hold that the only duplicates which are excluded under section
90.953 (1) of the Florida Statutes are negotiable instruments.393
XIII. Conclusion
Florida courts discussed so many different evidentiary issues dur-
ing this time that drawing any conclusions is difficult. In the criminal
procedure area, the Florida Supreme Court decided important cases
dealing with the Williams Rule, privilege against self-incrimination, re-
strictions on cross-examination of a witness about pending charges and
hypnotically related testimony. Also in criminal cases, the district
courts of appeal split over whether the state can "impeach" its own
witnesses on direct examination by exposing their weaknesses before
defense counsel has an opportunity to do so. Ideally the Florida Su-
preme Court will soon resolve this issue, if it has not done so before this
article's publication. 9 4
On the civil side, Florida District Courts of Appeal took a defense-
oriented, conservative approach to admission of subsequent remedial
measures evidence. Likewise, the Florida courts continue to take a re-
strictive position toward admission of psychotherapist-patient commu-
nications in child custody cases. Finally the admission of expert testi-
mony concerning thermograms was denied.
Judging various opinions to try to discern a general overall trend is
almost like comparing apples with oranges. However, both authors be-
lieve that Florida courts need to write better opinions when dealing
392. Id. at 96.
393. 472 So. 2d at 1354. Another opinion dealing with duplicates is E.F.K. Col-
lins Corp. v. S.M.M.G., Inc., 464 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The Col-
lins court does not report enough facts to permit a determination as to why a trial
court's admission of a copy of a sublease was erroneous.
394. On July 10, 1986, the Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict in favor
of permitting a direct examiner to bring out his own witness' weakness. The Florida
Supreme Court correctly ruled that such questioning was not impeachment. See Bell v.
State, 491 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1986); Sloan v. State, 491 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1986); State v.
Price, 491 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1986).
1986] 1105
85
Dobson and Braccialarghe: Survey: Evidence
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
1106 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 10
with evidentiary issues. Too often, courts stated the general principle of
law involved and jumped straight to a conclusion with little or no ex-
plicit factual analysis. Evidentiary questions are almost always "fact-
bound." Thus, for appellate opinions to have any real effect in this
area, they must present complete analysis of both the facts and the law.
At times this happened during the survey period, such as in the Third
District Court of Appeal's well-reasoned Compulsory Process Clause
decision. Our hope is that all future evidentiary opinions will be as
thorough.
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